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ATKINS V. VIRGINIA: A PSYCHIATRIC 
CAN OF WORMS 
DOUGLAS MOSSMAN, M.D: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past quarter century, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly told the 
nation's criminal courts, "If you want to impose the death penalty, get psychiatric 
help!" After the Supreme Court ruled in 1972 that sentencers could not have 
"untrammeled discretion" in how they imposed the death penalty, I some states 
changed capital punishment statutes to make the death penalty automatic when 
homicides were committed under specific conditions.2 But in rulings issued between 
1976 and 1982, the Supreme Court said that this solution was unacceptable: state 
statutes had to let the judges and juries who issue death sentences consider 
individualized information about each defendant.3 Sentencers must have the 
opportunity to learn about any aspect of a defendant's character that might be 
offered in mitigation, and then must weigh potential mitigating factors when 
deciding a defendant's fate.4 Such factors include information presented in 
testimony by mental health professionals about a defendant's broken home, his 
being abused in childhood, and his adulthood emotional disturbances.s 
In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court was asked whether simply having a mental 
disability-mild mental retardation-should exempt a murderer from the death 
penalty. The majority's answer in Penry v. Lynaugh6 was no. The Court did say that 
letting jurors consider expert testimony about retardation and childhood abuse was 
crucial to a "reasoned moral response" about whether to impose a death sentence.7 
Yet when Penry was issued in 1989, only two states had statutes that prohibited 
execution of persons simply because they had mental retardation.8 The Court 
thought this was not "sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus" that 
executing such persons would be "cruel and unusual punishment." 9 
When the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia lO in June 2002, however, 
eighteen of the thirty-eight states that permitted capital punishment also had 
legislation that barred the execution of persons with mental retardation. II This 
legislative trend helped convince a majority of justices that the "national consensus" 
required to exempt mentally retarded persons from the death penalty now existed. 12 
* Professor and Director. Division of Forensic Psychiatry, Wright State University School of Medicine; 
Adjunct Professor, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A., Oberlin College. 1976; M.D .• University of 
Michigan, 1981. The author thanks Marshall B. Kapp. Stephen J. Morse. and Michael L. Perlin for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
I. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 248 (1972). 
2. See generally Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
3. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280; Lockett, 438 U.S. 586. 
4. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-17 (1982). 
5. Id. at 107-08. 
6. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). The Supreme Court issued a subsequent decision concerning the same appellant, 
Penry. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (200 I) (see infra note 28 for discussion of this later Penry case). 
7. Id. at 322. 
8. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-14 (2002). 
9. Penry, 492 U.S. at 322. 
10. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
II. Id.at314-15. 
12. Id. at 316. 
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As a result, a practice that the Court found acceptable in 1989 had become 
unconstitutionally "cruel and unusual punishment" thirteen years later. 
Whether Atkins reflects good legal reasoning or-as Justice Scalia called it in his 
dissent-"nothing but the personal views of its members,"l3 it is poor psychiatric 
thinking for three reasons. First, Atkins implicitly assumes that persons with mental 
retardation comprise a discrete psychiatric category of individuals who are readily 
and naturally distinguishable from other persons, when, in fact, the opposite is the 
case: mental retardation is a classification defined by arbitrary statistical boundaries. 
Second, Atkins mistakenly (and perhaps ominously) approves of basing opinions 
about moral capacities on a person's psychiatric diagnosis; in offering protection to 
a group of mentally disabled persons, Atkins at the same time stigmatizes those 
citizens as morally inferior by virtue of their mental condition. Third, through its 
characterization of the links between reduced moral culpability, mental retardation, 
and exemptions from the death penalty, Atkins commits the American criminal 
justice system to deciding whether sufferers of other psychiatric disabilities also 
have reduced blameworthiness and deserve barriers to execution. 
This article offers one psychiatrist's perspective on the problems Atkins raises for 
courts that handle death penalty cases. In contrast to the overarching aim of the 
majority's opinion in Atkins-making the administration of capital punishment more 
equitable-the Supreme Court's latest prescription of psychiatric help may only add 
a new layer of complexity and confusion to the already capricious process through 
which the U.S. criminal justice system imposes death sentences. To explain why, I 
first provide a brief review of the Supreme Court's 1989 Penry decision, focusing 
on the role that evidence of mental retardation played in death penalty cases before 
Atkins was decided. Section ill then considers Daryl Renard Atkins' criminal case, 
which nicely illustrates the type of information that Penry required jurors to consider 
in making death penalty determinations-and the contributions of mental health 
professionals to those jury determinations. Following this, the article looks at how 
the Supreme Court majority in Atkins characterized the appellant's mental condition 
and the diagnostic process. Section IV discusses the actual process of diagnosing 
mental retardation, the ambiguities in that process, and the way that courts and 
legislatures may distort clinical diagnosis for use in legal proceedings. Section V 
describes the contradiction between professional organizations' treatment of, and 
response to, Atkins and these organizations' customary stance on the use of 
diagnoses for non-clinical purposes. Section VI describes the potential implications 
of the Atkins decision for capital defendants with psychiatric problems as 
incapacitating as, or more disabling than, mental retardation. Section VII concludes 
with a summary of how the Atkins majority's statements may affect testimony by 
mental health experts, and the effect of such testimony in future death-sentencing 
determinations. 
13. [d. at 338. 
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n. THE BACKDROP FOR ATKINS: PENRY V. LYNAUGH 
In October 1979, Johnny Paul Penry entered the horne of Pamela Livingston and 
raped, beat, and fatally stabbed her.14 Penry, a then-twenty-two-year-old man on 
parole following a previous rape conviction, gave authorities two confessions 
following his arrest, and, after being found competent to proceed with adjudication 
by the trial court, Penry underwent a jury trial for capital murder in March 1980. 15 
Penry raised the insanity defense at his trial, so that before jurors made their 
decision about his guilt, they had heard defense-introduced psychiatric testimony 
describing his mental retardation, the beating he suffered in childhood, and the brain 
damage that probably resulted. 16 The defense also presented testimony from Penry's 
mother, sister, and aunt describing his physical and emotional mistreatment during 
childhood and his problems with mastering even modest cognitive tasks. 17 Jurors 
also had heard rebuttal testimony from two psychiatrists called by the prosecution. 18 
Although the State's experts did not support an insanity verdict, they both 
acknowledged that Penry's intellect was extremely limited and that he could not 
learn from mistakes. 19 
The jury found Penry guilty of capital murder.20 The following day, at the close 
of Penry's penalty hearing, the jury decided whether Penry deserved a death 
sentence by considering three "special issues": 
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased 
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death 
of the deceased or another would result; 
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts 
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and 
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the 
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the 
deceased.21 
The jury gave unanimous affirmative responses, which, under then-existing Texas 
law, required the trial court impose a death sentence.22 
In his habeas petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, Penry made two claims: (1) the 
Texas death-sentencing process violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment by precluding jurors from weighing mitigating 
evidence about his mental condition in their sentencing deliberations and (2) to 
execute a mentally retarded killer would itself be cruel and unusual punishment.23 
The Court endorsed Penry's first claim.24 Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra 
Day O'Connor noted that the Court had previously endorsed Texas's sentencing 
14. Penry. 492 U.S. at 307. 
15. [d. at 307-08. 
16. [d. at 308-09. 
17. [d. at 309. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. at 310. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. (quoting TEx. CODECRIM. PROC. ANN .• art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1989». 
22. [d. 
23. [d. at 312. 
24. [d. 
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scheme "'on the assurance that. .. [it] would ... allow the jury to consider. .. mitigating 
circumstances ... , including a defendant's prior criminal record, age, and mental or 
emotional state,',,25 and that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that 
the sentencer 'not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect 
of a defendant's character. .. as a basis for a sentence less than death. ",26 The Court 
found that the wording of Texas's special issues, and the jury instructions at Penry's 
trial, prevented jurors from expressing their "reasoned moral response" to the 
mitigating evidence that Penry presented.27 For this reason, the Supreme Court 
remanded Penry's case for re-sentencing.28 
However, four Justices29 endorsed Penry's assertion that the Eighth Amendment 
required a per se death penalty exemption for all mentally retarded defendants. The 
majority felt that, under the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudential standards for 
ascertaining "evolving standards of decency,,,30 "[t]he clearest and most reliable 
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the 
country's legislatures.,,31 Poll data available in 1989 clearly suggested that the public 
opposed executing mentally retarded persons,32 but only Georgia and Maryland had 
enacted legislative bars.33 This was not enough "evidence of a national consensus 
against executing mentally retarded people" to convince a majority that such 
executions must always be unconstitutiona1.34 The majority decision signaled, 
however, that the Court might well conclude that executions of mentally retarded 
persons did offend "evolving standards of decency,,35 if several more state 
legislatures had enacted bars to such executions.36 
The Penry majority also considered arguments from amicus briefs, filed by the 
American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) "and other groups working 
with the mentally retarded," stating that mentally retarded persons' deficits in 
25. Id. at 316 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272-73 (1976)). 
26. Id. at 317 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978». The Court added that it had reaffirmed 
this position in holding that "'just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any 
mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating 
evidence."'ld. at 318 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982». 
27. Id. at 328. 
28. Id. at 340. When Texas retried Penry in 1990, he was again found guilty of capital murder and sentenced 
to death. Penry, 532 U.S. at 782. Penry's case once again found its way to the U.S. Supreme Court where, in Penry 
v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001), the Court held that instructions given to the jury during resentencing still did not 
allow jurors to properly utilize mitigating evidence at sentencing, and that the jury instructions were internally 
inconsistent.ld. at 799-800. As a result, the Court once again vacated Penry's death sentence and remanded his case 
to the trial court. Id. at 804. 
29. In separate opinions, Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) and Justice Stevens (joined by Justice 
Blackrnun), concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of 
mentally retarded offenders. Penry, 492 U.S. at 341-50. Justice Bre,nnan asserted that an offender's retardation 
always "limits his or her culpability so that. .. the ultimate penalty of death is always and necessarily disproportionate 
to his or her blameworthiness and hence is unconstitutional." Id. Justice Stevens asserted that the majority's 
discussion of competing arguments "respecting capital punishment of the mentally retarded ... compels the 
conclusion that such executions are unconstitutional." Id. at 350. 
30. Penry, 492 U.S. at 330-31 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
31. Id. at 331. 
32. Id. at 334-35 (summarizing data). 
33. Id. at 334. 
34. Id. at 335. 
35. Id. at 331. 
36. Id. at 335. 
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cognition and moral reasoning always prevented them from having the level of 
culpability needed to impose a death sentence.37 Although these deficits made 
mental retardation a mitigating factor that the sentencer "must be allowed to 
consider,,,38 the Penry majority could not "conclude that all mentally retarded 
people ... -by virtue of their mental retardation alone, and apart from any 
individualized consideration of their personal responsibility-inevitably lack the 
cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity" to deserve a death sentence.39 As the then-
current edition of AAMR's classification manual pointed out, persons with mental 
retardation are "a heterogeneous population" with "marked variations in the degree 
of deficit manifested.,,40 
Penry urged the Court to consider "mental age"-estimated by one expert in 
Penry's case as six and one-half years-as a reason to bar his execution, because a 
normal child so young would certainly be spared the death penalty.41 Justice 
O'Connor noted, however, that mental age calculations were imprecise and did not 
factor in the capacity of mentally retarded persons to utilize adulthood experi-
ences.42 Moreover, making a retarded person's mental age a barrier to execution 
"could have a disempowering effect if applied in other areas of the law. Thus, on 
that premise, a mildly mentally retarded person could be denied the opportunity to 
enter into contracts or to marry by virtue of the fact that he had a 'mental age' of a 
young child. ,,43 
The heterogeneity of mentally retarded persons and the inherent imprecision in 
specifying mental impairment combined to convince a Supreme Court majority that 
it would be incorrect, and potentially stigmatizing, to declare that the diagnosis of 
mental retardation identified a group of persons who always lacked full moral 
accountability.44 Instead, said Penry, a capital defendant with mental retardation 
should be judged as would any other such defendant-as a unique individual, any 
of whose personal traits might serve as a factor militating against the ultimate 
sanction.45 This majority position served as the backdrop against which jurors 
assessed the culpability of Daryl Renard Atkins, whom the Commonwealth of 
Virginia tried for capital murder in 1998.46 
m. THEATKINSDECISION 
1Il.A. Prelude to Murder 
Though Daryl Atkins was still a teenager when he was arrested for murder, his 
intellectual limitations and potential criminality had been evident for years. 
37. Id. at 336. 
38. Id. at 337. 
39. [d. at 338. 
40. {d. (quoting CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 12 (Herbert 1. Grossman, M.D. ed., Am. Ass'n 
on Mental Deficiency 1983». Concerning the tenth edition, see infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
41. Penry, 492 U.S. at 339. 
42. {d. 
43. {d. at 340. 
44. Id. at 338. 
45. {d. at 319. 
46. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 448 (Va. 1999) (noting that jury selection took place in 
February 1998). 
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Documents prepared by Atkins' appeals attorneys report that he flunked and 
repeated second grade and received mainly Ds and Fs through seventh grade.47 
School officials finally referred him for special education testing, but he never was 
evaluated.48 He got all Fs in eighth grade, and despite not meeting requirements for 
entering high school, he was placed in the ninth grade, where his average was D+.49 
During the two years he spent in the tenth grade, he averaged a D_.50 He did better 
once he was placed in classes for "slow learners," but he still left school without 
graduating.51 By age eighteen52-when he was arrested and charged with the murder 
of Eric Nesbitt-Atkins had not learned how to do laundry or cook meals for 
himself. 53 
Atkins' serious antisocial behavior began in early adolescence. At age thirteen, 
he was convicted of breaking and entering and petty larceny,54 and he started 
abusing drugs in the eighth grade. 55 At age seventeen, he was convicted of two 
counts of grand larceny for stealing from two other boys.56 A few months before 
Nesbitt's murder, Atkins participated with other youths in two armed robberies; 
during one of these he hit the victim on the head with a bottle.57 Two weeks before 
Nesbitt's murder, Atkins approached a woman, held a pistol to her head, hit and 
knocked her down with the gun, started to leave, then returned and shot her in the 
stomach. 58 
At around midnight on August 16, 1996-having spent the day drinking alcohol 
and smoking marijuana-Atkins and William Jones drove to a 7-11 store, intending 
to rob a customer.59 Eric Nesbitt, an airman from Langley Air Force Base, became 
their victim. The two men robbed Nesbitt at gunpoint, then took him to a nearby 
ATM and forced him to withdraw $200.60 They then drove to a deserted area and, 
ignoring Nesbitt's pleas to leave him unharmed, shot him eight times.61 A videotape 
of the A TM transaction allowed police to identify and locate the two men.62 When 
arrested, Atkins told police that Jones had shot Nesbitt.63 Jones gave no statement 
when police caught him, but later, with a lawyer present, Jones told authorities 
47. Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2000) (No. 00-8452), available at 
hup://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_counlbriefs/00-8452/00-8452.mer.petitioner.pdf(last visited Apr. 7, 2003} 
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner in Atkins J. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at II. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 10. 
52. Id. at 2. According to information maintained by Virginians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, 
Atkins' date of birth is November 6, 1997, which means he was eighteen and three-fourths years old in August 
1996. Virginians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, The Men on the Row, at http://www.vadp.orglmenrow.htm 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2003). 
53. Brief for Petitioner in Atkins, supra note 47, at 15 n.24. 
54. {d. at 13 n.20. 
55. Id. at 12 n.19. 
56. Id. at 13 n.20. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Brief for Petitioner in Atkins, supra note 47, at 1-2. 
63. Id. at 2. 
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Atkins did the shooting, and was allowed to plead guilty to fIrst-degree murder in 
exchange for his testimony against Atkins.64 
IIl.B. Atkins's Trial and State Appeal 
At Atkins' trial, both men said the other shot and killed Nesbitt, but Jones' 
testimony was "more coherent and credible," and the jury convicted Atkins of 
capital murder.65 During the trial's penalty phase, jurors heard about Atkins' 
previous criminal activity.66 The defense responded with one witness, a 
psychologist, who testifIed about his interviews of people who knew Atkins, his 
examination of school and court records, and results of an IQ test he had 
administered on which Atkins scored only 59.67 Despite the psychologist's 
testimony that Atkins was "mildly mentally retarded" and would not pose a threat 
to others in prison, the jury sentenced Atkins to death.68 Atkins had to have a second 
sentencing hearing because the original trial court had used a misleading verdict 
form.69 At the second hearing, jurors again heard psychological testimony about 
Atkins' retardation, plus testimony from his father and grandmother.7o Nonetheless, 
Atkins again received a death sentence.71 
On appeal, Atkins' lawyers did not argue that execution would be dispro-
portionate to penalties imposed for similar crimes in Virginia.72 Rather, they con-
tended that Atkins should not be sentenced to death because he was mentally 
retarded.73 A majority of the Virginia Supreme Court justices rejected this con-
tention, relying on the holding in Penry that mental retardation could be a mitigating 
factor, but not an absolute barrier to capital punishment.74 Two of the justices 
disagreed, however, stating that although retarded persons commit crimes, they are 
"less culpable for their criminal acts" than other offenders because they "have 
substantial limitations not shared by the general population. A moral and civilized 
society diminishes itself if its system of justice does not afford recognition and 
consideration of those limitations in a meaningful way.,,75 
IIl.C. The U.S. Supreme Court's Decision 
bnpressed by "the gravity of the concerns expressed" in the Virginia Supreme 
Court's dissenting opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Atkins' case and 
to revisit their 1989 decision in Penry.76 Between 1989 and 2002, the number of 
states with laws barring death sentences for mentally retarded persons had grown 
64. [d. 
65. Atkins. 536 U.S. at 307 
66. [d. at 308. 
67. [d. at 308-09. 
68. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 451, 453 (Va. 1999). 
69. [d. at 457-58. 
70. Brief for Petitioner in Atkins, supra note 47, at 14-17. 
71. [d. at 20. 
72. Commonwealth v. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d 312,318 (Va. 2000). 
73. [d. 
74. [d.at319. 
75. [d. at 325 (Hassell, J., dissenting). 
76. 536 U.S. at 310. 
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from two to eighteen, and legislatures in three other states had taken steps toward 
adopting such laws.77 Because of the passage of so many laws since the Penry 
. decision, a Supreme Court majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, stated that 
"[m]uch has changed" in the public's attitude about executing retarded persons.78 
This "national consensus,,,79 which reflected "the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society,,,80 required the Court to change the stance 
it had adopted just thirteen years earlier. Henceforth, a diagnosis of mental 
retardation would spare any murderer from the death penalty. 
Footnote three in Atkins quotes at length from diagnostic criteria that pro-
fessional organizations have developed to identify people with mental retardation.81 
The ninth edition82 of the AAMR' s classification manual states that the term "mental 
retardation" refers 
to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by 
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with 
related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill 
areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-
direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental 
retardation manifests [itself] before age 18.83 
The current diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
describes mental retardation as 
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning ... accompanied by 
significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following 
skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, sociaVinterpersonal skills, 
use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, 
leisure, health, and safety ... [with] onset... before age 18 years. 84 
Referring to such criteria, Justice Stevens' opinion states that, "by definition," 
persons with mental retardation "have diminished capacities to understand and 
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from 
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impUlses, and to understand 
the reactions of others.,,85 Although retarded criminals may know right from wrong, 
their mental deficiencies "diminish their personal cUlpability .... Thus, pursuant to 
77. ld. at 314-15. 
78. ld. at 314. 
79. Id.at316. 
80. ld. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (describing criterion for interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment)). 
81. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.3. 
82. Concerning the current edition, see infra note 83. 
83. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, 
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter AAMR 9). For the most current edition 
of this text see AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, 
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS (10th cd. 2002) [hereinafter AAMR 10). 
84. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENT ALDrsORDERS 
(4th ed., text revision 41,2000) [hereinafter DSM-N-TRI. This definition is quoted in Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.3. 
85. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
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our narrowing jurisprudence, which seeks to ensure that only the most deserving of 
execution are put to death, an exclusion for the mentally retarded is appropriate. ,,86 
Ill.D. Official Praise 
In official mental health circles, reactions to Atkins have been favorable. The 
AAMR and the AP A were among the many mental health organizations that had 
signed on to amicus briefs urging the Supreme Court to ban execution of retarded 
persons.87 When the Atkins decision was announced, Doreen Croser, AAMR's 
Executive Director, was "deeply grateful" that the Supreme Court stopped "this 
barbaric practice of killing persons who do not have the full intellectual capacity to 
understand the crime they committed .... This is an important day for disability 
advocates and for our country.,,88 Renee Binder, M.D., chair of the APA's 
Committee on Judicial Action, praised the decision "because it recognizes that there 
are objective and reliable determinations of whether an individual has mental 
retardation when the assessment is done by qualified professionals with substantial 
experience. ,,89 
Dr. Binder's comment echoes points emphasized in the amicus brief that the APA 
(along with the American Psychological Association and the American Academy 
of Psychiatry and Law) filed with the Supreme Court. 90 The brief argued that 
making a psychiatric diagnosis the basis for a life-or-death legal decision would 
cause no scientific or practical problems.91 Both "incorrect diagnoses" and 
"unnecessary legal wrangling" could be avoided when determining whether an 
accused killer has mental retardation "because mental retardation can be identified 
using time-tested instruments and protocols with proven validity and reliability.,,92 
To diagnose a person as having mental retardation, states the brief, professionals 
must find that "three necessary criteria are all present: significant limitations in 
intellectual functioning, significant limitations in practical or 'adaptive' functioning, 
and onset before adulthood.,,93 The brief claims that psychologists and psychiatrists 
can make "an objective determination" about whether an accused killer suffers from 
mental retardation using established tests of intelligence and adaptive functioning, 
86. Jd. at 319. 
87. Jd. at 316 n.21. 
88. American Association of Mentally Retarded Persons, AAMR Applauds U.S. Supreme Court Decision 
to Ban Execution of Persons with MeTltal Retardation, at http;/lwww.aarnr.orgIPolicies/death_penalty.shtml (last 
updated July 5, 2002). 
89. Ken Hausman, Court Bars Execution of MeTltally Retarded Criminals, 37 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, July 19, 
2002, at I, available at http://pn.psychiatryonline.org. 
90. Brief Amici Curiae American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, and 
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (00-8727) 
[hereinafter APoAl APaAlAAPL Brief). In March 200 I, the Supreme Court agreed to hear McCarver, a case brought 
by a North Carolina inmate who, like Atkins, was mentally retarded. 532 U.S. 941. When North Carolina later 
passed a statute barring execution of persons with mental retardation, McCarver became moot, and the Supreme 
Court dismissed the case. McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001). The Court subsequently allowed amici 
curiae briefs submitted in McCarver to be considered in support of Daryl Atkins' appeal. Atkins v. Virginia, 534 
U.S. 1053 (2001). Perusal of the amicus briefs filed by mental health organizations for McCarver suggests that these 
were highly influential in the majority's decision in Atkins. 
91. APoAlAPaAlAAPL Brief, supra note 90, at 3. 
92. Jd. 
93. Jd. 
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so that clinicians "undertaking separate assessments should reach the same 
conclusion."94 Yet to anyone knowledgeable about mental retardation, the tests used 
to establish its presence, how clinicians diagnose mental retardation, and the status 
of psychiatry in general, this assertion is remarkable. 
IV. IS MENTAL RETARDATION A DISTINCTIVE CATEGORY? 
IV.A. Psychiatric Diagnosis: Utility versus Validity 
In a recent article, psychiatrists Robert Kendell and Assen lablensky describe the 
beneficial influence that current, ruled-based diagnostic schemes have had on 
psychiatric practice.95 The AP A's 1980 diagnostic manual96 established an approach 
to classifying psychiatric disorders, maintained in subsequent editions, in which 
diagnoses are not dependent on theories of pathogenesis. Instead, mental disorders 
are categorized using lists of explicit criteria, a minimum number of which are 
required to render a specific diagnosis.97 Among the benefits of a standard, 
psychiatric lingua franca are better diagnostic agreement and communication 
between mental health professionals and "improve[d] communication with the users 
of services, care-givers, and society at large."98 
Although current diagnostic classifications help psychiatrists organize clinical 
information and make treatment decisions, that does not necessarily mean that those 
classifications accurately reflect reality. "Thoughtful clinicians" recognize the still-
primitive nature of psychiatric diagnosis, state Drs. Kendell and Jablensky.99 Yet 
many a diagnostic concept nonetheless 
tends to become reified. That is, people too easily assume that it is an entity of 
some kind that can be invoked to explain the patient's symptoms and whose 
validity need not be questioned .... [T]he mere fact that a diagnostic concept is 
listed in an official nomenclature and provided with a precise, complex 
definition tends to encourage this insidious reification. 100 
Drs. Kendell and lablensky note that most medical specialities do not characterize 
disorders according to constellations of symptom, but by underlying pathological 
processes. 101 With a few exceptions (e.g., Alzheimer's disease), however, the entities 
that psychiatrists call "disorders" are not associated with or defined by patterns of 
neuronal pathology but represent only commonly occurring associations of 
symptoms and signs of illness. 102 As Drs. Kendell and Jablensky put it, "Psychiatry 
94. [d. 
95. Robert Kendell & Assen Jablensky, Distinguishing Between the Validity and Utility of Psychiatric 
Diagnoses, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1,4 (2003), available at http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org. 
96. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICALMANUALOFMENT AL DISORDERS 
(3rd ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-llI]. 
97. [d. 
98. Kendell & Jablensky, supra note 95, at 4. Atkins represents graphic evidence of this last point, in that 
the majority's position directly applies easily understood psychiatric diagnostic criteria to a legal decision. See 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
99. Kendell & Jablensky, supra note 95, at 5. 
100. [d. 
101. [d. at 8-9. 
102. [d. at 9. 
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is in the position-that most of medicine was in 200 years ago---of still having to 
define most of its disorders by their syndromes."I03 Indeed, these authors note, 
Several well-informed commentators have produced evidence suggesting that 
there may be no natural boundary between recognized mental disorder and 
normality or health .... Cloninger ... stated firmly that "there is no empirical 
evidence" for "natural boundaries between major syndromes," that "no one has 
ever found a set of symptoms, signs, or tests that separate mental disorders fully 
into non-overlapping categories," and that "the categorical approach .. .is 
fundamentally flawed .... " The accumulation of such evidence and opinions led 
Allen Frances, the chairperson of the task force that produced DSM-IV, and 
Helen Egger to comment gloomily, but perhaps presciently, that "we are at the 
epicycle stage of psychiatry where astronomy was before Copernicus and 
biology before Darwin. Our inelegant and complex current descriptive system 
will undoubtedly be replaced by ... simpler, more elegant models."I04 
N.B. Defining Mental Retardation 
What is true of psychiatric diagnosis in general is especially true when it comes 
to mental retardation. 105 The "by definition" language of the Atkins decision suggests 
that persons who receive the diagnosis of mental retardation comprise a group of 
individuals whose constellation of deficits clearly distinguishes them from non-
retarded persons. 106 Yet the diagnosis of mental retardation--despite its clinical 
usefulness-is an entirely artificial construct: the line that separates persons who 
receive this diagnosis from individuals whose mental capacities are only well below 
averagelO7 is a changing and arbitrary one. 
There is no better illustration of this last point than decisions of the AAMR to 
"update" its definition of mental retardation ten times over the past century. lOS The 
most recent changes were published five days before the Atkins decision, in the tenth 
edition of the AAMR' s official classification manual.109 Although psychiatric 
103. [d. 
104. [d. at 7 (citations omitted). 
105. Though I describe here the flaws and limitations of current psychiatric diagnostic schemes, I am not 
claiming that mental illness is merely a social construct for identifying deviant individuals whose behavior makes 
us label them as "different." Like almost all psychiatrists, I think that persons who are diagnosed with mental 
disorders generally have real (and often biologically based) problems, but our current diagnostic schemes are far 
from perfect. For the classic statement of the view that mental illnesses are really just problems in living, see 
Thomas S. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, 15 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 113 (1960) ("the concept of mental illness 
has outlived whatever usefulness it might have had and that it now functions merely as a convenient myth"); but 
see Michael S. Moore, Some Myths About "Mental Illness", 32 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1483 (1975) for a 
discussion offive versions of the "mental-illness-is-a-myth" argument in radical psychiatry and reasons for rejecting 
each version. 
106. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310. 
107. Psychiatrists refer to such persons as having "borderline intellectual functioning." This is not deemed 
an official "disorder" but is one of several "conditions that may be a focus of clinical attention." OSMoN -TR, supra 
note 84, at 740. 
108. American Association on Mental Retardation, Definition of Mental Retardation, at http://www.aarnr 
.0rgIPolicieslfaq_mentaUetardation.shtml (last updated July 29, 2002). The changes are summarized in AAMR 
9, supra note 83, at ix. Between 1959 and 1973, persons with IQs as high as 85 might have satisfied the then-current 
AAMR definition. [d. For a short historical summary of definitions and tenns used to describe persons with mental 
retardation, see Edmund J. Sass, Definitions of Mental Retardation: A Chronological List With Dates and 
References, at http://www.c1oudnet.coml-edrbsass/mrdetinitions2.htm(lastupdatedFeb.15. 2001). 
109. AAMR 10, supra note 83. 
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diagnoses are often revised to reflect new understandings, scientific breakthroughs, 
or availability of new treatment approaches, sometimes social and political 
developments play a role. 110 The AAMR advertisements for Mental Retardation: 
Definition, Classification and Systems of Supports state (unabashedly) that the 2002 
edition 
proposes a state-of-the-art method to define, classify, and support an individual 
with mental retardation. In view of the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision to 
ban execution of persons with mental retardation, the 10th edition is a timely and 
critical resource to the states as they strive to come up with a current and fuller 
definition of mental retardation. III 
The AAMR currently defines mental retardation as "a disability characterized by 
significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as 
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This disability 
originates before the age of 18."112 This characterization appears reasonably close 
to the previously quoted definition used by the American Psychiatric Association. 
Beyond this point, however, the two groups begin to part. The APA's diagnostic 
manual categorizes mental retardation according to its global severity, that is, as 
either mild, moderate, severe, or profound. 113 Since 1992, however, the AAMR has 
rejected this approach.114 Instead, diagnosticians are asked to examine patterns of 
limitations in a person's everyday functioning, and to then describe the degree of 
support those persons need, which may be "intermittent," "limited," "extensive," or 
"pervasive.,,115 
If persons with mental retardation were members of a homogeneous, discrete 
biological or psychological category of persons, readily distinguished from persons 
without mental retardation, professional organizations might have an easier time 
settling on clinical criteria for diagnosing the condition. Some retarded persons 
exhibit impairments that make them easily identifiable: they have severe academic 
110. See generally HERB KUTCHINS & STUART A. KIRK, MAKING Us CRAZY: DSM: THE PSYCHIATRIC BIBLE 
AND THE CREATION OF MENTAL DISORDERS (1997). For example, the authors observe, 
[d. at 16. 
Although the conventional view claims that science and hard evidence underlie decisions about 
DSM, we find that political negotiation and advocacy-as well as personal interest-are just as, 
and often more, important in determining whether a diagnosis is created ... [Sjcience is often 
subordinated to social and political influences in the development and use of the diagnostic 
categories contained in DSM. 
111. American Association on Mental Retardation, AAMR Home Page, Hot Off the Press, at http://www. 
aamr.org/ (last visited Apr. 12,2003). 
112. AAMR 10, supra note 83, at I. 
113. DSM-IV -TR, supra note 84, at 42-44. 
114. As the AAMR states, 
Rather than mold individuals into pre-existing diagnostic categories and force them into existing 
models of service, the supports approach evaluates the specific needs of the individual and then 
suggests strategies, services and supports that will optimize individual functioning. The supports 
approach also recognizes that individual needs and circumstances will change over time. 
Supports were an innovative aspect of the 1992 AAMR manual and they remain critical in the 
2002 system. 
American Association on Mental Retardation, Fact Sheet: Frequently Asked Questions About Mental Retardation: 
What are Supports?, at http://www.aamr.orgIPolicies/faq_mentaUetardation.shtml (last updated July 29, 2002). 
115. The AAMR's recommended diagnostic process is summarized in AAMR 9, supra note 83, at 23-34. 
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problems during childhood, limited communication skills, and need, even as grown-
ups, to be supervised at work or where they live. 116 But such individuals make up 
only 15 percent of all retarded persons. ll7 Mildly retarded persons, who comprise 
about 85 percent of all retarded individuals, usually develop social and work skills 
that are "adequate for minimum self-support," though they need guidance in making 
complicated decisions. 118 As preschoolers, they often are indistinguishable from 
non-retarded children. 119 The medical conditions that can cause intellectual 
impairment are countless and include chromosomal defects, biochemical 
abnormalities, and infections that alter the brain's development before birth or 
during early childhood. 120 Doctors often can find a distinct biological source of a 
child's retardation, although many things that can cause serious intellectual 
impairment do not always do SO.121 In many cases of mild mental retardation, 
doctors can point to no specific medical reason for the person's limitations. 122 
Clinicians thus cannot use biological tests to decide whether a person is mentally 
retarded. 
N.C. Placement on the "Bell Curve" 
Instead, professionals identify persons with mental retardation using tests that 
measure intelligence and social capabilities. 123 When the intellectual capabilities of 
a large, randomly selected group of persons are measured by such tests, the result 
is what statisticians call a "normal distribution," often described as a "bell curve"124 
(which gave the title to Herrnstein and Murray's controversial bookl25 on the 
subject). At one end of the distribution lie geniuses and on the other end are 
116. The impairments of these individuals would result in their being diagnosed, in the DSM-IV-TR 
classification system, as having moderate, severe, or profound retardation. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 84, at 43-44. 
117. [d. 
118. [d. at 43. 
119. [d. 
120. [d. at 45-46. For additional discussion of conditions that may cause mental retardation, see 
Developmental Problems, in THE MERCK MANUAL § 19, ch. 262 (Mark H. Beers, M.D., & Robert Berkow, M.D., 
eds., 2003), at http://www.merck.comlpubs/mmanuaVsectionI9/chapter2621262e.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2003). 
121. [d. 
122. See DSM-IV -TR, supra note 84, at 45 ("In approximately 300/0--40% of individuals seen in clinical 
settings, no clear etiology for the Mental Retardation can be determined despite extensive evaluation efforts. 
Specific etiologies are more likely to be identified in individuals with Severe or Profound Mental Retardation."). 
123. See generally AAMR 10, supra note 83, at 24-25. 
124. Mathematicians often call this a "Gaussian" distribution, a term that honors the important work of the 
German mathematician and astronomer Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777-1855). The normal distribution was first 
described by Abraham De Moivre in 1733, but his paper was not discovered until 1924. The formula for the curve 
is 
1 (X-Il)' f(x)= J2i e -2;;' 
(1 21r 
where J.l is the mean (center) of the distribution and ois the standard deviation. WAYNE W. DANIEL, BIOSTATISTICS: 
A FOUNDATION FOR ANALYSIS IN THE HEALTH SCIENCES, THIRD EDITION 79 (1983). When the normal distribution 
is used to represent the scores of a population, the fraction of the total area under the curve that lies between two 
points along the distribution represents the fraction of the population having scores that fall within a particular 
range. 
125. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE (1994). 
HeinOnline -- 33 N.M. L. Rev. 268 2003
268 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
profoundly impaired persons; bright, average, and dull folks make up the vast 
majority in the middle. Intelligence testing lets psychologists place an individual 
along the spectrum of cognitive ability because such testing produces a numerical 
result-an "intelligence quotient" or IQ score. Less-well-known tests let 
psychologists and mental retardation specialists rank individuals in terms of other 
"adaptive" capabilities I 26-such as communication abilities, work skills, and caring 
for oneself-for which the population as a whole is also continuously distributed. 127 
IQ scores are set up so that the "mean" or average score is 100, and the "standard 
deviation"-a statistical term referring to mathematical properties of the bell 
curve-is 15. Approximately ninety-five percent of a normally distributed 
population lies within two standard deviations of the mean, and individuals lying 
outside this arbitrary statistical boundary are often deemed "abnormal." A cut-off 
IQ score of "approximately 70,,128_two standard deviations below the mean score 
of 100-is the intelligence score used in the APA's current diagnostic manual to 
separate persons with mental retardation from those designated as having 
"borderline intellectual functioning.,,129 
The modifier "approximately" in the APA's diagnostic criteria reminds mental 
health professionals that using 70 as a cut-off score reflects a statistical convention 
rather than a natural boundary between two distinctive groups of individuals. When 
conscientious mental health professionals interpret IQ scores and plan treatment 
interventions, they keep in mind that someone who scores 69 on an IQ test is 
practically indistinguishable from someone who scores 71, and that two persons 
with an IQ of, say, 67 and 73 have much more in common with each other than with 
a person who scores 88. If pre-Atkins state statutes and post-Atkins decisions are any 
guide, however, legislatures and courts often ignore such considerations when they 
put Atkins into practice. Of the eighteen state statutes in effect when Atkins was 
126. Examples include the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (V ASS) and the AAMR Adaptive Behavior 
Scales. The V ASS may be used to assess the social and personal skills of both disabled and nondisabled persons 
and covers the age range of birth to adulthood. The AAMR school scale is specifically designed for children who 
may have mental retardation and measures social skills, social adjustment, and level of independence. The AAMR 
residential and community scale is designed for adults who may have mental retardation and assesses social 
behavior, personal independence, and responsibility in daily living. For a description and explanation of these, and 
other behavior assessment scales, see JEROME M. SA TILER, ASSESSMENT OF CHILDREN: BEHAVIORAL AND CLINICAL 
ApPLICATIONS 191-209 (4th ed. 2002). 
127. At its website, the AAMR states, 
Adaptive behavior is the collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that people have 
learned so they can function in their everyday lives. Significant limitations in adaptive behavior 
impact a person's daily life and affect the ability to respond to a particular situation or to the 
environment. 
limitations in adaptive behavior can be determined by using standardized tests that are normed 
on the general population including people with disabilities and people without disabilities. On 
these standardized measures, significant limitations in adaptive behavior are operationally 
defined as performance that is at least 2 standard deviations below the mean of either (a) one of 
the following three types of adaptive behavior: conceptual, social, or practical, or (b) an overall 
score on a standardized measure of conceptual, social, and practical skills. 
AAMR, Fact Sheet: Frequently Asked Questions About Mental Retardation: What is Adaptive Behavior?, at 
http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq_mentaCretardation.shtml (last updated July 29,2002). 
128. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 84, at 42,49. 
129. [d. at 740. 
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decided, eleven had language that made specific IQ scores part of the criteria for 
exempting a defendant from facing a possible death penalty. 130 
Some subsequent state court decisions have followed the same pattern. For 
example, in defining mental retardation for purposes of capital sentencing, the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals required that "no person shall be eligible to 
be considered mentally retarded unless he or she has an intelligence quotient of 
seventy or below.,,131 The Ohio Supreme Court's declaration of "substantive 
standards and procedural guidelines in determining whether convicted defendants 
facing the death penalty are mentally retarded" begins with the clinical definitions 
promulgated by the AAMR and AP A. After noting, however, that most existing 
"state statutes prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded require evidence 
that the individual has an IQ of 70 or below," the Ohio Supreme Court's definition 
adds to clinicians' criteria "a rebuttable presumption that a defendant is not mentally 
retarded if his or her IQ is above 70."132 Using such precise cut-offs mistakenly 
suggests that a one-point difference in two persons' scores reflects a significant 
difference in their cognitive capacity. 
N.D. Reliability of Measurements 
The availability of IQ test scores suggests that mental health professionals can 
offer courts objective, precise methods for deciding who is, or is not, impaired 
enough to receive the death penalty. Yet the numbers that IQ tests generate are far 
from being perfectly reliable measurements of a person's cognitive ability. Under 
the best conditions, IQ tests have a "measurement error" of about five points. 133 An 
individual who scores, say, 68 on one administration has a ninety-five percent 
chance of scoring between 63 and 73 on subsequent administrations. More than half 
130. MD. ANN. CODE § 2-202(b)(1)(i) (2002) (IQ "0f70 or below"); KY. REV. STAT. § 532.130(2) (2002) 
(IQ "0f70 or below"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(a)(1) (IQ "0f70 or below"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-
2.1 (A) (2003) (IQ "of 70 or below"); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (2) ("rebuttable presumption of mental retardation 
when a defendant has an intelligence quotient of sixty-five (65) or below"); WASH. REv. CODE § 1O.95.030(2)(c) 
(2003) (defining significantly below average intellectual functioning as IQ less than 70); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
105.01(3) (stating that IQ less than 70 is "presumptive evidence of mental retardation"); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 
23A-27 A-26.2 (stating that IQ less than 70 is "presumptive evidence of mental retardation"); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. 
13-703.02 (2003) (pre-screening IQ score of75 triggers additional assessment; IQ less than 65 establishes rebuttable 
presumption of mental retardation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(1) (2002) ("'significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning' means performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a 
standardized intelligence test"); N.C. SESS. LAw 2001-346 § I ("'significantly subaverage general intellectual 
functioning' means performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized 
intelligence test"). 
131. Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002). 
132. State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d lOll, 1014 (Ohio 2002). 
133. DSM-N -TR, supra note 84, at 41. For this reason, a leading text on child assessment states, "Individuals 
who use the test findings need to know that the IQ and other major scores used to make decisions about the child 
are not perfectly accurate because they inherently contain measurement error." JEROME M. SATTLER, ASSESSMENT 
OF CHILDREN: COGNITIVE ApPLICATIONS 109 (4th ed. 2001). Similar considerations underlie recommendations in 
psychologists' official technical manual to report IQ scores using a range (or interval) of values: 
[Rjeporting a score in terms of confidence intervals is a means of expressing the reliability of 
that test score. Confidence intervals assist the examiner in test interpretation by delineating a 
range of scores in which the examinee's "true" score most likely falls, and reminds the examiner 
that the observed score contains measurement error. 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CORPORATION, 1997 W AIS-ID-WMS-ID TECHNICAL MANUAL 182. 
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of those persons whose IQ results fall in the mildly retarded range receive scores of 
65 to 70,134 that is, their scores' margin of error will include 70. 
Another source of uncertainty stems from the fact that, for many items, the test 
administrator has to decide how many points a subject's response deserves. In 
normal clinical use, these imperfections do not matter a great deal. When testing a 
defendant for whom a one- or two-point change in IQ score has life-and-death 
implications, however, clinicians may have a hard time being dispassionately 
"objective" about how they interpret a response. The net result of all these 
imperfections is that judges, or juries, 135 will often have a hard time deciding on 
which side of the arbitrary line between mentally retarded and merely "dull" a 
defendant falls. 
If IQ testing generates nettlesome problems with imprecision and measurement 
error, measuring adaptive functioning-a key feature defining mental retardation 136 
-is even trickier. As one leading text on behavioral assessment points out, several 
134. On an IQ test for a nonnally distributed population with a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15, 1.29 
percent of results can be expected to fall between 65 and 70, and 2.14 percent of results will fall between 55 and 
70. Thus, about 57 percent of the results between 55 and 70 lie between 65 and 70. See DANIEL, supra note 124, 
at 491 (Table F). 
135. The issue of who is constitutionally pennitted or required to make the ultimate determination about 
mental retardation goes far beyond the scope of this article. In Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002), the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that aggravating factors in Arizona's death penalty statute operate as '''the functional equivalent 
of an element of a greater offense, .. ' and that the Sixth Amendment therefore requires that a jury-not merely a 
judge-must determine that they are present if a death sentence is to be imposed. Id. at 2443 (quoting Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,494 n.19 (2000». Whether, following Atkins, the absence of mental retardation is an 
aggravating factor that must be detennined by jurors remains a still open question. 
Yet, even if courts or statutes assign this detennination to jurors, judges may still playa key role. For 
example, Murphy v. State remands a condemned prisoner's case back to the district court 
for an evidentiary hearing on the sole issue of Petitioner's claim of mental retardation in 
accordance with this Order. At that hearing, ... the District Judge shall detennine if Petitioner has 
raised sufficient evidence (at trial, on appeal, or at the evidentiary hearing) of his mental 
retardation ... for the issue of mental retardation to be decided as a question of fact by a jury at 
a resentencing hearing. 
Murphy, 54 P.3d at 570. 
Murphy appears to give the judge a gate-keeping role and the jury the ultimate decision-making role. However, 
the decision also states, 
The trial judge's duty at an Atkins hearing [on mental retardation) is to detennine whether or not 
the factual detenninations relating to the issue of mental retardation were imposed by the jury 
under the influence of passion, prejUdice, or any other arbitrary factor. In administering this duty, 
the trial judge shall conduct his or her own de novo review of the evidence presented at 
trial. ... Where a trial judge detennines that a defendant is mentally retarded and, consequently, 
that the jury's decision finding the defendant not mentally retarded was due to the influence of 
passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor, that issue may be raised as a proposition of error for 
this Court to consider as part of its mandatory sentence review. 
Id. at 569. 
By contrast, the Ohio Supreme Court has placed the decision-making power solely in the hands of the trial 
judge: 
The trial court shall make written findings and set forth its rationale for finding the defendant 
mentally retarded or not mentally retarded. We believe that these matters should be decided by 
the court and do not represent a jury question. In this regard, a trial court's ruling on mental 
retardation should be conducted in a manner comparable to a ruling on competency (i.e., the 
judge, not the jury, decides the issue). 
Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1015. 
136. See SATTLER, supra note 126 (describing DSM-IV-TR definition of mental retardation). 
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features of adaptive behavior make it "difficult to define.,,137 Adaptive behavior is 
really not separable from intelligence; individuals use both cognitive and behavioral 
abilities to master social problems and function in their environment. What counts 
as adaptive behavior changes as one grows older: during school years, academic 
performance is crucial, but in adulthood, living independently and ability to earn a 
living are paramount. Adaptive behavior is also a function of a person's living 
situation and the demands of his unique social environment. Some people can 
function adequately in a close-knit rural town but cannot cope with demands of life 
in an urban metropolis. Far more than is the case with measuring intelligence, 
"adaptive behavior represents the interaction of personal, cognitive, social, and 
situational variables.,,138 Finally, the various available instruments for measuring 
adaptive behavior may give different results. This may be a consequence of 
differences in the instruments' content, the type of responses the instruments 
require, the times at which the instruments were created, the types of persons used 
to develop the instruments, or simply the pers~ms who do the ratings. 139 
V. DIAGNOSES, LEGAL CATEGORIES, AND DISCRIMINATION 
The APA's support of the Atkins decision is strikingly at odds with organized 
psychiatry's well established opposition to using diagnostic categories for legal and ' 
social purposes. In a 1996 amicus brief filed in Kansas v. Hendricks I4°-a Supreme 
Court case concerning post-prison confinement of sex offenders-the APA 
explained why legal decisions should not be determined by categories derived from 
a medical diagnostic scheme: 141 
The classification schemes are developed and periodically altered, through 
comprehensive field trials, research, and analysis, to serve diagnostic and 
statistical functions, forming a common (and always imperfect) language for 
gathering clinical data and for communication among mental health 
professionals .... Such comprehensive classification schemes are not. .. designed 
to identify those [persons who are] subject to various legal standards .... Not all 
137. [d. at 190. 
138. [d. 
139. [d. 
140. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (holding that Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act, which 
pennits civil commitment of persons who, due to a mental abnonnality or a personality disorder, are likely to engage 
in "predatory acts of sexual violence," satisfies substantive due process requirements and violates neither the 
Constitution's double jeopardy prohibition nor its ban on ex post facto lawmaking). 
141. Leroy Hendricks suffered from pedophilia. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360. According to DSM-IV-TR, 
pedophilia is diagnosed when a person is sixteen years or older, 
[0] ver a period of at least 6 months, [has] recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual 
urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child or children (generally age 
13 years or younger)[,] ... [t]he person has acted on these urges, or the sexual urges or fantasies 
cause marked distress or interpersonal difficulty[, and] ... [t]he person is at least age 16 years and 
at least 5 years older than the child or children. 
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 84, at 572. 
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individuals who come within a DSM_IV[142] category suffer an impairment that 
diminishes their autonomy. 143 
In recent decades, each edition of the APA's diagnostic manual has included a 
"Cautionary Statement" stating that the manual's purpose 
is to provide clear descriptions of diagnostic categories in order to enable 
clinicians and investigators to diagnose, communicate about, study, and treat 
people with various mental disorders .... The clinical and scientific considerations 
involved in categorization of these conditions as mental disorders may not be 
wholly relevant to legal judgments, for example, that take into account such 
issues as individual responsibilityl44 
The APA's diagnostic manuals also have emphasized the limitations of the 
diagnostic schemes they exemplify. The manuals have aimed not to categorize 
people, but to categorize their mental disorders. Therefore, it is wrong to believe that 
all individuals who are diagnosed with a particular disorder "are alike in all 
important ways .... [I]ndividuals sharing a diagnosis are likely to be heterogeneous 
even in regard to the defining features of the[ir] diagnosis and boundary cases will 
be difficult to diagnose in any but a probabilistic fashion.,,145 Noting that the 
"imperfect fit" between legal and medical categories poses "risks" and "dangers" of 
misusing diagnoses, the current manual warns (as did its predecessor) that, when 
deciding whether a person meets a particular legal standard of responsibility, 
"additional information is usually required beyond that contained in the [manual's] 
diagnosis. This might include information about the individual's functional 
impairments and how these impairments affect the particular abilities in question." 146 
In other words, until Atkins, the APA consistently opposed equating a person's 
moral and legal responsibility to his psychiatric diagnosis. 
Since its enactment in July 1990, the APA has vigorously endorsed the 
Americans With Disability Act (ADA), which provides broad protections against 
discrimination based on mental or physical disabilities. 147 This position is consistent 
with organized psychiatry's longstanding wish to reduce the discrimination and 
stigma associated with having a mental disorder. 148 In a 1997 position statement, the 
142. "DSM-N" refers to AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV). This was the current edition of the DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS when this statement was written. 
143. Brief of Amici Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 22-23, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346 (I995) (Nos. 95-1649, 95-075). 
144. DSM-N-TR, supra note 84, at xxxvii; DSM-N, supra note 142. at xxvii; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3rd ed., revised xxix, 1987). A 
similar, but shorter, statement appeared in DSM-ill, supra note 96, at 12. 
145. DSM-N-TR, supra note 84, at xxxi. 
146. [d. See also DSM-N, supra note 142, at xxii (containing the same language as DSM-N-TR). 
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (1994). 
148. See Eve Bender, With Politics and Mentall/lness, the More Things Change, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Nov. 
1.2002. at 10 (describing the persistence of bias against political candidates with mood disorders) (quoting Steven 
Mirin, M.E .• APA Medical Director, who stated, ''The fight against stigma has been waged on a number of 
fronts ... [including) the arena of public education, where the APA has a leadership role"). Two fonner APA 
presidents have co-edited a book aimed at reducing the stigma associated with mental illness. See STIGMA AND 
MENTAL ILLNESS (Paul Fink & Allan Tasman eds., 1992). See also PaulJay Fink, Dealing with Psychiatry's Stigma, 
37 Hosp. COMM. PSYCHIATRY 814 (1986) (contending that "[t)he stigma associated with psychiatry is the most 
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APA criticized allowing psychiatric diagnoses to influence decisions about 
employment, insurance, housing, or credit, because such decisions often reflect 
widespread but baseless beliefs about mental conditions. 149 Indeed, said the AP A, 
categorical distinctions based on mental disorder are tantamount to class 
discrimination because they assume that everyone who has received a particular 
diagnosis or treatment is identical. In fact, individuals with the same 
diagnosis ... may manifest different kinds of symptoms; even when the symptoms 
are the same, they may vary widely in their severity. Nor is there a direct or 
simple connection between symptoms severity and impairments that may be 
relevant to a particular decision: so 
Yet Atkins makes exactly this kind of "categorical distinction": it says explicitly 
that all persons diagnosed with mental retardation necessarily lack the capacity to 
accept full moral responsibility for their actions. 151 Justice Scalia made this very 
point in his dissent: "[TJhe Court concludes that no one who is even slightly 
mentally retarded can have sufficient 'moral responsibility to be subjected to capital 
punishment for any crime. As a sociological and moral conclusion that is 
implausible .... ",152 
Justice Scalia might have added that, in many social contexts, making blanket 
decisions about people because of a mental disability-for example, denying them 
jobs, accommodations, or public services out of a belief that their disability makes 
them less responsible-has become illegal since the passage of the ADA. 153 The 
more progressive approach-the approach mandated by the ADA and (usually) 
advocated by mental health professionals-is to make an individualized decision 
about a defendant, taking into account his mental condition, but not allowing it to 
determine his moral worth. 154 Individualized decision making was the capital 
sentencing process that the Supreme Court's Penry decision had recommended and 
that two sentencing juries implemented when they condemned Atkins. 155 After 
hearing ample testimony about his mental retardation, jurors concluded, as Justice 
Scalia put it, that Atkins' condition "was not a compelling reason to exempt him 
from the death penalty in light of the brutality of his crime and his long 
demonstrated propensity for violence.,,156 
In criticizing his colleagues for their support of the majority's position in Atkins, 
psychologist-attorney Donald Bersoff has voiced the same concerns about an 
absolute ban on executing retarded persons that Justice O'Connor had articulated in 
critical problem facing the profession"). 
149. APA Council on Psychiatry and Law, Position Statement on Discrimination Against Persons with 
Previous Psychiatric Treatment, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1042 (1997). 
150. [d. 
151. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
152. [d. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 863-64 (1988)(Scalia, 
J., dissenting». 
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994) (barring disability-based discrimination in employment); see also 42 
U.S.c. § 12132 (1994) (barring disability-based discrimination related to public services); 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994) 
(prohibiting discrimination by public accommodations suppliers). 
154. See state statutes, supra note 130. 
155. Penry, 492 U.S. at 320-22; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308-09. 
156. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Penry.157 The support by mental health professionals of the barring of executions of 
retarded persons, Professor Bersoff argues, 
is short-sighted .... As important as it is to protect those who cannot protect 
themselves, it is equally important to promote the right of all persons to make 
their own choices, and, as a corollary, to be accountable for those choices. It is 
simply untrue that no person with mental retardation is incapable of carrying out 
a horrible murder with the requisite intent or foresight. If we accept the concept 
of blanket incapacity, we relegate people with retardation to second class 
citizenship, potentially permitting the State to abrogate the exercise of such 
fundamental interests as the right to marry, to have and to rear one's children, 
to vote, or such everyday entitlements as entering into contracts of making a 
will. ISS 
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF ATKINS 
VI.A. Broad Discretion in Implementing Atkins 
The most obvious and immediate consequences of Atkins stem from the 
substantive and procedural latitude given to state courts and legislatures that will 
implement the decision. The decision uses the diagnostic criteria of experts in 
mental disability to show that persons with mental retardation are "by definition"159 
less culpable and can never deserve a death sentence. Yet nothing in Atkins requires 
states to follow diagnostic criteria used by mental health professionals when they 
effectuate the decision's constitutional mandate. To the contrary, the Atkins majority 
specifically left the task of codifying criteria for mental retardation to the states. 160 
In many states with pre-Atkins statutes, specific IQ scores are either required for 
a diagnosis of mental retardation or constitute presumptive evidence for or against 
that diagnosis.161 Such laws potentially give results of a single administration of a 
single intelligence measure far more weight than mental health professionals believe 
is warranted and reflect a mode of decision making that is explicitly rejected in the 
previously quoted AP A and AAMR diagnostic criteria. 162 In most cases, statutes use 
two standard deviations below the mean IQ score as the cut-off point, 163 but in some 
statutes, other scores (e.g., 65 1640r 75 165) are used for key decisions. In addition to 
adopting different IQ cut-off scores, states may create other substantive variations 
in their definitions of mental retardation. Also, states would appear to have some 
latitude in procedural matters, e.g., statutory provisions for testing and introducing 
157. Donald N. Bersoff, Some Contrarian Concerns About Law, Psychology, and Public Policy, 26 LAw & 
HUM. BEHAV. 565, 568 (2002). 
158. ld. 
159. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
160. ld. at 317 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,416-17 (1986) ("As was our approach in Ford 
v. Wainwright, with regard to insanity, 'we leave to the Staters] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce 
the constitutional restriction upon its execution of sentences. "')). 
161. See state statutes, supra note 130. 
162. See section m.c, supra. 
163. See state statutes, supra note 130. 
164. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (a)(2) (2003) ("rebuttable presumption of mental retardation when a 
defendant has an intelligence quotient of sixty-five (65) or below"). 
165. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 13-703.02(C) (pre-screening IQ score of 75 triggers additional evaluation). 
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evidence about intellectual functioning. The result could well be that, when states 
implement the Atkins ban, some will do so in ways that will permit execution of 
persons whom many mental health professionals would deem mentally retarded. 
Also, varying definitions and procedures could mean that some states will execute 
persons whom the statutes of other states would have exempted from the death 
penalty. 
The problems with giving courts or legislatures the job of defining a mental 
disorder are reflected in some early post-Atkins decisions. At least one state supreme 
court has stated that it would leave this task to the legislature: 
It would not be appropriate for this court to usurp the authority of the legislature 
by fashioning procedural and substantive standards in relation to the Atkins 
hearing. Such matters are, best left to the determination of the legislature 
following discussion and debate. The legislature may choose to eventually adopt 
procedural standards to govern Atkins issues that arise prior to conviction and 
sentence. We recognize that the circuit courts will have to conduct these 
hearings, at least for the time being, without definitive guidance from the 
legislature or from this COurt. 166 
By contrast, in September 2002, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered, sua sponte, that 
oral argument be held on the "appropriate procedures" and the "appropriate 
substantive standard" for deciding whether a capital defendant has mental 
retardation,167 and subsequently created a definition that gives decision-making 
power to the trial court. 168 
When the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals faced the task of creating its 
state's definition of mental retardation, it observed, 
That puts this State in an interesting position, considering our legislature has 
attempted to do just that, but our Governor has apparently disagreed with the 
legislature's efforts. Thus, the task falls upon this Court to develop standards to 
guide those affected until the other branches of government can reach a meeting 
of the minds on this issue. 169 
Oklahoma's definition is substantially similar to the one found in DSM-JV-TR and 
requires the defendant "to prove he or she is mentally retarded by a preponderance 
of the evidence at trial."170 The court notes that "[i]ntelligence quotients are one of 
the many factors that may be considered," and "are not alone determinative" of 
mental retardation. 171 Despite this, the court's definition states that "to be considered 
mentally retarded," a defendant must have "an intelligence quotient of seventy or 
below, as reflected by at least one scientifically recognized, scientifically approved, 
and contemporary intelligent quotient test.,,172 
166. People v. Pulliam, No. 89141, 2002 D1. LEXIS 947, *62 (III. Oct. 18,2002). 
167. State v. Lott, 774 N.E.2d 1220, 1221 (Ohio 2002). 
168. State v. Lott, 779 N.E.2d lOll, 1015 (Ohio 2002). 
169. Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 567 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002). 
170. [d. at 568. 
171. [d. 
172. [d. (citations omitted). 
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At least one federal court has already commented on the lack of direction in 
Atkins. 173 In Bell v. Cockrell, the court had to determine "what to do with a capital 
habeas case in which the petitioner has consistently offered clinical evidence of 
mental retardation since his first trial, which took place in the 1970' s. ,,174 Discussing 
the disagreement between the petitioner's and Texas's beliefs about handling the 
case, the court said, 
What this divergence of views exhibits is the welter of uncertainty following 
Atkins .. .. The Supreme Court neither conclusively defined mental retardation nor 
provided guidance on how its ruling should be applied to prisoners already 
convicted of capital murder .... ln these circumstances, inferior federal courts 
have no useful role to play until and unless following Atkins, a death sentence 
is reaffirmed or again imposed on Bell by the state courts. Just how the state 
courts will implement Atkins, we cannot say.175 
VI.B. Misplaced Fears of Faking 
The belief that exculpatory mental problems are easily faked has deep roots in 
Anglo-American law. 176 As Professor Michael Perlin has noted, fear of feigned 
mental illness has "permeated the American legal system for over a century,',177 and 
"the fear of feigned insanity and the distrust of expert witnesses' ability to identify 
malingering behavior continues to dominate insanity defense jurisprudence.,,178 It 
is therefore not surprising that Justice Scalia's Atkins dissent raises the fear of faking 
mental retardation by capital defendants, asserting that exempting mentally retarded 
persons from the death penalty will tum "the process of capital trial into a game," 
and that a simple reading of the official AAMR and AP A definitions of mental 
retardation shows "this condition can readily be feigned.,,179 . 
In fact, examination of diagnostic criteria suggests that mental retardation is hard 
to fake successfully, because the criteria require evidence that retardation began 
during childhood-evidence, that is, that the condition existed years before the 
defendant committed a capital crime. On occasion-for example, when young 
criminals like Atkins are involved-information about the defendant's childhood 
academic performance and social functioning may be sparse or ambiguous. In these 
cases, the defendant's current behavior (feigned or genuine) may influence what 
mental health experts conclude about his life-long capacities. But a possibility of 
spurious claims is not a reason for barring all1egal claims of a certain sort, assuming 
that the reason for allowing such claims is sound in the first place. 18o State 
173. Bell v. Cockrell, 310 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2002). 
174. [d. at 331. 
175. [d. at 332-33. 
176. Joel Eigen, Historical Developments in Psychiatric Forensic Practice: The British Experience, 6lNT'L 
lL. & PSYCHIATRY 423, 427-28 (1984) (quoting statement made in 1681 by Sir Robert Holbron that "a man may 
counterfeit himself to be mad, he may do it so cunningly as it cannot be discerned whether he be mad or so"). 
177. Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: 
Random Decisions. Hidden Rationales. or Doctrinal Abyss? 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 1,98 (1987). 
178. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 236 (2000). 
179. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
180. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 917-18 (Cal. 1968) (stating the possibility of "fraudulent 
assertions ... in isolated cases does not justify wholesale rejection of the entire class of claims in which that 
potentiality arises"). 
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legislatures do not like to be perceived as coddling violent criminals, but concerns 
about faking did not stop many states from adopting statutory bars against executing 
the mentally retarded. 181 Presumably, courts can deal with false claims of mental 
retardation as well as they deal with false claims of medical and psychological 
problems that arise in a variety of other legal circumstances. Moreover, in 
considering Justice Scalia's concern, it is important to recognize that assessing 
malingering is a core skill for mental health clinicians,182 particularly in contexts 
where being (or appearing) ill may confer advantages (e.g., avoiding punishment, 
financial awards) on the eValuee. 183 
Malingering is not, strictly speaking, a psychiatric diagnosis, because a feigned 
disorder is not, after all, a real disorder. Yet the APA diagnostic manual lists 
malingering as one of the "conditions that may be a focus of clinical attention" and 
tells clinicians, 
Malingering should be strongly suspected if any combination of the following 
is noted: 
1. Medicolegal context of presentation (e.g., the person is referred by an 
attorney to the clinician for examination) 
2. Marked discrepancy between the person's claimed stress or disability and 
the objective findings [i.e., what the clinician directly observes in the evaluee's 
behavior] 
3. Lack of cooperation during the diagnostic evaluation and in complying 
with the prescribed treatment regimen 
4. The presence of Antisocial Personality Disorder'84 
Mental health professionals can use several tests specifically designed to detect 
feigned psychological problems, including the validity scales on the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI_2),185 the Structured Interview of 
Reported Symptoms (SIRS),186 the Validity Indicator Profile (VIP),187 and the Test 
Id. 
181. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16. The Atkins Court states, 
Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation 
providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States prohibiting 
the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States passing 
legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides powerful evidence that 
today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the 
average criminal. The evidence carries even greater force when it is noted that the legislatures 
that have addressed the issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition. 
182. See CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION (Richard Rogers ed., 2nd ed. 1997), a 
leading text on the detection of malingering [hereinafter CLINICAL ASSESSMENT]. 
183. See generally Loren Pankratz & Laurence M. Binder, Malingering on Intellectual and Neuro-
psychological Measures, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 182, at 223-36 (describing general principles of 
assessment and examples of tests to detect malingered cognitive problems). These authors comment that "the 
clinician should attend to the possibility of malingering any time financial issues or other external incentives are 
present." Id. at 232. 
184. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 84, at 739. 
185. See Roger L. Greene, Assessment of Malingering and Defensiveness by Multiscale Personality 
Inventories, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 182, at 169-207 (describing development and use of various 
MMPI scales in detecting malingering). 
186. See Richard Rogers, Structured Interviews and Dissimulation, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 182, 
at 169-207 (describing development, evaluation, and applications of the SIRS). 
187. See Richard I. Frederick et aI., Validation of a DE'tector of Response Bias on a Forced-Choice Test of 
Nonverbal Ability, 39 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 118 (1994) (desclibing the evaluation of the VIP). 
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of Memory Malingering (TOMM). 188 Recent scholarship has offered clinicians new 
perspectives on the mathematical interpretation of results from malingering tests. 189 
Vl.c. A Psychiatric Can ofWormsl90 
Rather than worry about an onslaught of malingered mental retardation in the 
wake of Atkins, courts should ready themselves to address the decision's most 
obvious 10gical191 consequence: the claim that defendants with other serious mental 
limitations deserve diagnosis-based death penalty exemptions. Indeed, prominent 
psychiatrists called for this shortly after Atkins was announced. 192 Dr. Diane H. 
Schetky, the principal author of the APA's position statement opposing death 
sentences for persons who commit crimes as juveniles, believes that "our current 
knowledge of neurological and psychological developments in adolescents" means 
that the Supreme Court's arguments for sparing retarded persons from the death 
penalty "can and should be applied to individuals who commit their crimes as 
juveniles.,,193 Former APA president Dr. Alan A. Stone, noting that many forensic 
188. See Tom N. Tombaugh, The Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM): Normative Datafrom Cognitively 
Intact and Cognitively Impaired Individuals, 9 PSYCH. ASSESSMENT 260 (1997) (describing the development and 
validation of the TOMM). 
189. See Douglas Mossman & Kathleen J. Hart, Presenting Evidence of Malingering to Courts: Insightsfrom 
Decision Theory, 14 BEHAV. SCI. L. 271 (1996) (introducing the concept of Bayes's Theorem for interpreting the 
results of malingering measures); Douglas Mossman, The Meaning of Malingering Data: Further Applications of 
Bayes's Theorem, 18 BEHAV. SCI. L. 761 (2000) (responding to other authors' criticisms of the Bayesian approach 
and describing additional techniques for test interpretation); Douglas Mossman, Interpreting Clinical Evidence of 
Malingering: A Bayesian Perspective, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 293 (2000) (applying Bayesian methods 
to clinical data); Douglas Mossman, Daubert, Cognitive Malingering. and Test Accuracy, 27 LAw HUM. BEHAV. 
229 (2003) (examining courts' application of Daubert to tests of cognitive malingering). 
190. In its amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Atkins, the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (CJLF) 
suggested that U.S. law on who might receive capital punishment was, after a "torturous" process, now fairly settled, 
but declaring a constitutional bar to executing mentally retarded persons would "reopen this can of worms" by 
causing "a disruption of the important and complex body of law surrounding capital punishment" that had 
developed since Furman. Brief of Amici Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation at 7 -8, Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452). The CJLF brief suggests that exempting persons with mental retardation would 
increase jurisprudential complexity and uncertainty as courts and legislatures attempted to predict future develop-
ments in death penalty law-that is, it would reopen a legal can of worms. This section suggests that by giving the 
Court's imprimatur to equating moral incapacity with one's mental disability, Atkins will force courts to examine 
the moral incapacities associated with other mental disabilities and has thus opened a psychiatric can of worms at 
least as messy as the legal problems that the CJLF feared. 
191. As section VI.C explains, the whole notion of equating a particular mental disability with moral desert 
involves a logical mistake. Here, the phrase "logical consequence" only implies that, in establishing, as a 
constitutional principle, that defendants with mental retardation are less culpable and therefore deserve a death 
penalty exemption, the Supreme Court has obligated itself (and lower courts) to consider whether defendants with 
other, equally disabling mental disabilities also deserve an exemption. To refuse to do so would be logically 
inconsistent with Atkins. 
192. Law professors immediately had similar thoughts. See RALPH REISNER, ET AL., 2002 UPDATE, LAw AND 
THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 17 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the logical extension 
of Atkins' protections to persons with mental illnesses); see also Christopher Siobogin, What Atkins Could Mean 
for People with Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293 (2003). Every lawyer and judge with whom the author has 
discussed the Atkins decision believes that it entails an exemption for persons with mental illness similar to the 
exemption now available for persons with mental retardation. 
193. Diane H. Schetky, Revisit Execution of Juveniles, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY NEWS, Sept. 2002. at 26. 
Puzzlingly, the Supreme Court declined to do this when, in a 5-4 decision in In Re Stanford, it refused to grant 
certiorari. 123 S. Ct. 472 (2002). As Justice Stevens commented in his dissent, the petitioner asked the Court "to 
hold that his execution would be unconstitutional because he was under the age of 18 when he committed his 
offense .... There are no valid procedural objections to our reconsideration of the issue now, and, given our recent 
decision in Atkins v. Virginia .... we certainly should do so." Id. at 472 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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psychiatrists l94 favor total abolition of the death penalty, believes that if executing 
the mentally retarded is unconstitutional, then "it is certainly reasonable for the 
abolitionists to argue that it is equally unconstitutional to execute the mentally ill." 195 
Mental illness and mental retardation have similar causes, says Dr. Stone, and "the 
mentally ill suffer from many of the same limitations" that (in the Supreme Court's 
view) diminish the blameworthiness of retarded persons. 196 "I believe the time will 
come when we recognize that it is equally indecent to execute the mentally ill."197 
VI.C.I. Cognitive Disorders Acquired after Childhood 
Obvious candidates for mental illness-based exemptions would be defendants 
who acquire, after childhood, the types of intellectual and functional deficits that 
persons with mental retardation display throughout their lives. Because of their 
adulthood onset, psychiatrists call such conditions "cognitive disorders"198 or "per-
sonality changes caused by medical conditions,,,199 rather than mental retardation. 
Examples include mental deterioration that sometimes follows drug abuse,2°O or 
brain-damaging events such as head injuries, infections, and Alzheimer's disease.201 
Particularly when the brain's frontal lobes are affected, persons lose their ability to 
integrate information, utilize experience, and control impulses.202 If a psychiatric 
definition is all that is required to lead courts to believe that retarded defendants are 
194. Psychiatrists with special expertise in and knowledge about conducting evaluations that are used in 
making legal determinations. 
195. Alan A. Stone, Supreme Court Decision Raises New Ethical Questions for Psychiatry, available at 
hnp:/Iwww.psychiatrictimes.com/p02090Ib.html(last visited Apr. 13,2003). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. See generally DSM-IV-TR, supra note 84, at 135-80 (discussing and setting out diagnostic criteria for 
various deliria, dementias, and amnestic disorders). 
199. Id. at 187. DSM-IV-TR characterizes a "personality change due to a general medical condition" as "a 
persistent personality disturbance that is judged to be due to the direct physiological effects of a general medical 
condition .... Common manifestations of the personality change include affective instability, poor impulse control, 
outbursts of aggression or rage grossly out of proportion to any precipitating psychosocial stressor, marked apathy, 
suspiciousness, or paranoid ideation." Id. For further description and diagnostic criteria, see id. at 187-90. 
200. Id. at 168-70 (discussing conditions and diagnostic criteria for "substance-induced persisting dementia"). 
In contrast to states of intoxication or delirium caused by drugs or other chemical compounds, this condition 
"persists long after the individual has experienced the effects of Substance Intoxication or Substance WithdrawaL" 
Id. at 169. Among the compounds that may produce this condition are inhalants, toxic medications, antiepileptic 
drugs, heavy metals, industrial solvents, and insecticides. Id. 
201. The official nomenclature calls this last condition "dementia of the Alzheimer's type."ld. at 154-58. For 
a discussion of dementias with other causes, see id. at 158-67. 
202. See Clifford B. Saper et aI., Integration of Sensory and Motor Function: The Association Areas of the 
Cerebral Cortex and the Cognitive Capabilities of the Brain, in PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE 356-58 (Eric R. 
Kandel et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000) (stating that lesions in or damage to the frontal cortex is associated with deficits 
in "active maintenance of information relevant to an ongoing behavior," i.e., "working memory"; "damage to the 
frontal lobe [causes] difficulty performing tasks that involve planning"); see also Markku Linnoila & Dennis S. 
Charney, The Neurobiology of Aggression, in NEUROBIOLOGY OF MENTAL ILLNESS 855, 860 (1999) (discussing 
association between anterior frontal lobe injury and "impulsive, aggressive, and antisocial functions ... [and] 
generally impaired impulse control"). 
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not fully accountable for their acts,203 then consistency 04 requires courts to exempt 
brain-damaged defendants from execution, too. 
VI.C.2. Schizophrenia205 
It probably is rare for jurors to mete out death sentences to defendants who are 
known to have dementia or demonstrable brain damage, so rules sparing such 
individuals might have little practical impact on capital punishment decisions. But 
in recent decades, psychiatrists have recognized that many death row inmates have 
mental conditions that are associated with impaired cognition and reasoning.206 A 
prime example is schizophrenia.207 A 1990 study found that one-fifth of homicide 
defendants may have this disorder.208 Estimates of the incidence of schizophrenia on 
death row vary widely, but published reports suggest rates of at least five percent, 
and perhaps much higher.209 With the nation's death row population currently 
standing at around 3700,210 this means that 200 or more condemned U.S. prisoners 
may have schizophrenia. 
Schizophrenia's best-known symptoms are delusions211 and hallucinations,212 and 
it is common for sufferers of the disorder to talk nonsense, to hold irrational but 
unshakable beliefs about reality, and to see or hear things that do not exist.213 
203. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002). 
204. Although "attaining consistency" seems like a reasonable jurisprudential goal to a psychiatrist, the author 
recognizes that this probably is not an adequate legal basis for a constitutionally-based death penalty exemption 
such as the one created by Atkins. Although a logically adequate basis might be an Eighth Amendment-based 
justification-executing people with demonstrable brain damage would be "cruel and unusual punishment" given 
modern standards of decency-no state has yet legislated a death penalty exemption for persons with severe mental 
illnesses. An Equal Protection-based argument therefore offers the best approximation to a constitutional basis for 
consistent treatment of persons with equally disabling mental conditions. A full discussion lies beyond the scope 
of this article, but this matter is dealt with at length by Professor Siobogin's article in this volume. See generally 
Christopher Siobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293 (2003). 
205. Portions of this subsection are adapted from a recent article written by the author. See Douglas Mossman, 
Unbuckling the "Chemical Straitjacket",' The Legal Significance of Recent Advances in the Pharmacological 
Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 1048-59 (2002). 
206. See. e.g., Richard M. Yarvis, Axis I and Axis II Diagnostic Parameters of Homicide, 18 BULL. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 249 (1990); see also Mark D. Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen. Death Row Inmate 
Characteristics. Adjustment. and Confinement,' A Critical Review of the Literature. 20 BEHAV. SCI. L. 191 (2002). 
207. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 84, at 298 ("Schizophrenia is a disorder that lasts for at least 6 months and 
includes at least I month of active-phase symptoms (i.e., two [or more) of the following: delusions, hallucinations, 
disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior. negative symptoms).") For descriptions and 
explanations of the symptoms, associated features, prevalence, course, and diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, 
see id. at 298-313. For additional discussion of schizophrenia and its treatment directed toward a legal audience, 
see Mossman, supra note 205, §§ II-ill. 
208. See Yarvis, supra note 206. at 255. 
209. See Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 206, at 193,200. 
210. Death Penalty Information Center. Size of Death Row by Year, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo 
.0rglDRowInfo.html#year (last visited May 6, 2003). 
211. A delusion is 
[a) false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite 
what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious 
proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not ordinarily accepted by other members of the 
person's culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith). 
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 84, at 821. 
212. A hallucination is "[a) sensory perception that has the compelling sense of reality of a true perception 
but that occurs without external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ." Id. at 823. 
213. Id. 
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Psychiatrists no longer think that schizophrenia is caused by traumatic experiences 
or failures to negotiate childhood phases of psychological development.214 Instead, 
the symptoms of schizophrenia are believed to reflect disrupted brain circUitry215 that 
produces abnormalities in information processing, filtering stimuli, attention, and 
working memory.216 Over the last quarter century, brain imaging studies (e.g., CT 
and MRI scans217) have shown that persons with schizophrenia have demonstrable 
decreases in brain matter/18 particularly in areas that are responsible for attention, 
memory, expressing emotion, social affiliation, and integrating information.219 
Persons with schizophrenia cannot make normal associations among ideas and 
cannot distinguish between their own thoughts and those of others. They cannot 
suppress or filter inconsequential stimuli properly, so they have trouble focusing on 
what is important. 220 Hallucinations occur when persons interpret their own thoughts 
as coming from outside themselves, while delusions arise from bad circuitry that 
makes bad connections between mental phenomena.221 
Persons with schizophrenia cannot help being susceptible to such symptoms, but 
these are often controllable with medication.222 Less remediable, however, are 
disturbances in complex mental processes that neuroscientists call "cognition" and 
214. Nancy C. Andreasen, A Unitary Model of Schizophrenia: Bleuler's "Fragmented Phrene" as 
Schizoencephaly, 56 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 781, 782 (1999). 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 783-84. 
217. For a wonderful, illustrated explanation of these and other brain imaging techniques, see Saper et aI., 
supra note 202, at 366-79. 
218. A recent meta-analysis of fifty-eight studies found that "cerebral volume was lower-and total 
ventricular volume was higher-in patients with schizophrenia than in comparison subjects." Ian C. Wright et aI., 
Meta-Analysis of Regional Brain Volumes in Schizophrenia, 157 AM. 1. PSYCHIATRY 16, 22 (2000). For a highly 
technical but authoritative summary of brain abnormalities ascertained in neuro-imaging studies, see Jeffrey A. 
Lieberman, Schizophrenia: A Neurodegenerative Disorder, 46 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 729,733-34 (1999). 
219. Alan Breier et aI., Brain Morphology and Schizophrenia: An MRI Study of Limbic, Prefrontal Cortex 
and Caudate Structures, 49 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 921 (1992); Nancy Andreasen et aI., Structural 
Abnormality in the Frontal System in Schizophrenia: A Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study, 43 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 135 (1986); Hilleke E. Hulshoff Pol et aI., Volume Changes in Gray Matter in Patients with 
Schizophrenia, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 244 (2002) ("smaller brains of patients with schizophrenia could be 
explained by smaller gray matter volumes," especially pre-frontal gray matter); Philip R. Szeszko et aI., 
Neuropsychological Correlates of Hippocampal Volumes in Patients Experiencing a First Episode of 
Schizophrenia, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 217, 221 (2002) (suggesting a relationship between loss of tissue in a 
portion of the brain usually associated with memory functioning and executive functioning indicates a defect in 
linkage of brain regions); see also Christos Pantelis et al., Neuroanatomical Abnormalities Before and After Onset 
of Psychosis: A Cross-sectional and Longitudinal MRI Comparison, 361 LANCET 281 (2003) (demonstrating that 
in some brain regions, reductions or abnormalities in gray matter precede onset of psychosis, and that abnormalities 
in other regions appear in association with the onset of psychosis). 
220. Andreasen, supra note 214, at 785. 
221. Id. 
222. One psychiatric practice guideline recommends, "with substantial confidence," the continual 
administration of anti-psychotic medication for the treatment of schizophrenia. See Marvin I. Herz et al., Practice 
Guideline for the Treatment of Patients with Schizophrenia, 154 AM. 1. PSYCHIATRY I, 2 (Apr. Supp. 1997)' 
("Antipsychotic medications are indicated for nearly all acute psychotic episodes in patients with 
schizophrenia .... [Pjsychiatrists should avoid withholding medications for [more than a period of several days) ... as 
this may delay tJ1e patient's recovery and place the patient at risk of suicide and other dangerous behaviors."). For 
several years, courts have also recognized the central importance of antipsychotic medication in treating 
schizophrenia. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131. 1137-38 (D.N.J. 1978)("[N)0 other treatment modality 
has achieved equal success in the treatment of schizophrenics .... [P)sychotropic drugs are widely accepted in present 
psychiatric practice .... They are the treatment of choice for schizophrenics today."). For a summary of the role and 
benefits of antipsychotic medication in schizophrenia, see Mossman, supra note 205, at 1062-73. 
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which, even more than overtly crazy thinking, are now recognized to be central to 
the disorder.223 The extent and severity of these disturbances (reflected in lack of 
emotion, reduced speech, and lost ability to initiate purposeful activity), rather than 
delusions and hallucinations, are the best predictors of the long-term disability that 
often occurs in schizophrenia.224 On average, schizophrenic patients-in addition to 
having hallucinations, delusions, and disorganized thoughts-experience a reduction 
in cognitive performance equivalent to having an IQ score of 85.225 Depending on 
when the disorder takes hold, persons with schizophrenia often cannot complete 
school, hold jobs, or have normal social relationships.226 
If the statistically defined limitations that comprise mental retardation are a 
barrier to the death penalty, then perhaps persons with schizophrenia-a disabling, 
biologically based disorder caused by disrupted brain circuits-should be spared as 
well. Lawyers for Jay D. Scott, an Ohio death row inmate, argued this very point in 
2001 while Atkins was pending. An Ohio Supreme Court majority rejected this 
claim,227 and Scott was ultimately executed. 228 But the defense's argument persuaded 
one dissenting justice, who protested, 
I cannot get past one simple irrefutable fact: [Scott] has chronic, undifferentiat-
ed schizophrenia, a severe mental illness .... As a society, we have always treated 
those with mental illness differently from those without. In the interest of human 
dignity, we must continue to do so .... Executing [Scott] will be another assertion 
that taking the life of a person with mental illness is no different than taking the 
life of someone without mental illness.229 
This clear categorical-exemption-for-mental-illness reasoning fits well within the 
majority's position in Atkins.230 
223. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 84, at 301; see generally Stanley R. Kay & Lisa M. Murrill, Predicting 
Outcome of Schizophrenia: Significance of Symptom Profiles and Outcome Dimensions, 31 COMPo PSYCHIATRY 
91, 97 (1990) (stating that thought disturbance predicts poor functional outcome); Tonmoy Sharma, Cognitive 
Function in Schizophrenia: Deficits, Functional Consequences, and Future Treatment, 26 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS 
N. AM. 25, 36 (2003) ("In the past few decades, cognitive dysfunction has been recognized as a fundamental feature 
of schizophrenia and has been shown repeatedly to have a negative association with functional outcome."); Ronald 
Goldman, Neuropsychological Dysfunction and Schizophrenia: Implicationsfor Pharmacotherapy, 18 DIRECTIONS 
IN PSYCHIATRY 35-47 (1998). 
224. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
225. Lieberman, supra note 218, at 733. In a comment crucial to this article's topic, DSM-IV-TR notes that 
differentiating "between Borderline Intellectual Functioning and Mental Retardation (an IQ of 70 or below) is 
especially difficult when the coexistence of certain mental disorders (e.g., Schizophrenia) is involved." DSM-IV -TR, 
supra note 84, at 740. 
226. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 84, at 302. 
227. State v. Scott, 748 N.E.2d II (Ohio 2001), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1034 (2001). 
228. Alan Johnson & Jon Craig, Scott Executed, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 15, 2001, at IA; Associated 
Press, Twice-Spared Killer Is Executed in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,2001, at A34. Scott's execution generated 
international coverage and protests. See, e.g., Mentally-ill Man Executedfor Murder in Ohio, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, 
June 15, 2001; Robert Tait, Outrage as Ohio Executes Mentally III Man, THE SCOTSMAN, June 16,2001, at 14; Sick 
Man Is Killed, HERALD SUN (Melbourne), June 16,2001, at 24; Audrey Gillan, Schizophrenic Man Put to Death 
in Ohio, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 16,2001, at 16. 
229. Scott, 748 N.E.2d at 19 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
230. Since the Atkins decision, at least one state supreme court has declined to extend the protections of Atkins 
to a person with psychotic symptoms. State V. Weik, 2002 S.c. LEXIS 159 (S.c. Sept. 3, 2002). Although the 
defendant "was 'hyper-religious,' heard voices, and suffered from paranoid beliefs involving the CIA and the 
Masons," id. at *4, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated summarily that, "while it violates the Eighth 
Amendment to impose a death sentence on a mentally retarded defendant, ... the imposition of such a sentence upon 
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VI.C.3. Attention-DeficitlHyperactivity Disorder 
Several other psychiatric conditions are legitimate candidates for exemptions 
following Atkins. Perhaps states should be barred from executing murderers with 
attention-deficitJhyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Although this condition has been 
the subject of much public controversy, most psychiatrists regard ADHD as a real 
disorder that can severely disrupt functioning in children and often persists into 
adulthood.231 According to DSM-IV-TR, ADHD is "a persistent pattern of 
inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that is more frequent and severe than 
is typically observed in individuals at a comparable level of development," that 
begins in childhood, and that interferes "with developmentally appropriate social, 
academic, or occupational functioning. ,,232 Inattention may lead to the sufferer's "not 
following details or rules"; impulsiveness can lead to "difficulties in social, 
academic, or occupational settings ... and to engagement in potentially dangerous 
activities without consideration of possible consequences.,,233 These types of 
problems lie behind much criminal behavior, and, not surprisingly, the incidence of 
ADHD is elevated in adult prison populations.234 As is the case for schizophrenia, 
brain imaging studies of individuals with ADHD consistently point to a biological 
basis for these problems, again suggesting abnormal development of neuronal 
circuitry.235 
VI.C.4. Low CNS Serotonin Function 
Another logical category for exemption is persons with low levels of the 
neurotransmitter serotonin.236 Since studies in the mid-1970s showed that suicide 
a mentally ill person is not disproportionate." Id. at *4, * 13. Weik simply cites previous precedent for support, 
without considering the specific reasoning in Atkins or types of data adduced in this article's text. Id. at * I 3 (citing 
State v. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d 19 (S.c. 1992). 
231. Christine Lehmann, APA Tells Congress ADHD Is Serious but Treatable, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Nov. I, 
2002, at I, 30 (describing testimony of David Fassler, M.D., on behalf of the American Psychiatric Association and 
the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and Richard Nakamura, Ph.D., acting director of the 
National Institute of Mental Health). 
232. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 84, at 85. 
233. /d. at 85-86. 
234. Stephen Curran & Michael Fitzgerald, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in the Prison Population, 
156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1664 (1999); Kirsten Rasmussen et aI., Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Reading 
Disability. and Personality Disorders in a Prison Population, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 186 (2001). 
235. Jay N. Giedd et aI., Brain Imaging of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, 931 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. 
SCI. 33, 33 (2001) ("[I)maging studies of individuals with attention deficitlhyperactivity disorder (ADHD) 
consistently point to involvement of the frontal lobes, basal ganglia, corpus callosum, and cerebellum."); Judith L. 
Rapoport et aI., Imaging Normal and Abnormal Brain Development: New Perspectives for Child Psychiatry, AUSTL. 
& N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 272, 272 (2001) ("[A)natomic brain magnetic resonance imaging (MRD studies in ADHD" 
reveal "consistent, diagnostically specific patterns of brain abnormality .... "); F. Xavier Castellanos et aI., 
Developmental Trajectories of Brain Volume Abnormalities in Children and Adolescents with Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, 288 J.A.M.A. 1740, 1740 (2002) (MRI study showing that "patients with ADHD 
had significantly smaller brain volumes in all regions ... [and in patterns,) suggesting that genetic and/or early 
environmental influences on brain development in ADHD are fixed, nonprogressive, and unrelated to stimulant 
treatment"). 
236. A neurotransmitter is a substance "released on excitation from the axon terminal of a presynaptic neuron 
of the central or peripheral nervous system [that) travel[s) across the synaptic cleft to either excite or inhibit the 
target cell. Among the many substances that have the properties of a neurotransmitter ... [is) serotonin." DORLAND'S 
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1215 (29th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DORLAND'S). 
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victims had low levels of serotonin metabolites in the central nervous system 
(CNS),237 scientists have accumulated robust evidence linking low serotonin activity 
to impulsive behavior, alcohol abuse, and violence.238 By measuring and manipulat-
ing serotonin activity in many species-including fish,239 birds,240 rodents, 241 dogs,242 
and monkeys,243 as well as humans244-scientists have found that lowering brain 
serotonin increases aggression, particularly spontaneous, impulsive aggression. 
Many individuals naturally have low serotonin activity, and such persons often are 
depressed, less responsive to external social controls of their behavior, and 
especially prone to satisfying appetites for food, sex, and drugs without thinking 
about consequences.245 
For a subset of heavy drinkers called "Type ll" alcoholics, alcohol consumption 
is part of an overall pattern of impulsive, antisocial behavior. Studies of Type II 
alcoholics reveal a genetic predisposition linking violence, heavy drinking, and 
deficient serotonin functioning. For example, a series of Finnish studies found that 
among alcoholic men, those with low serotonin activity were particularly prone to 
violence.246 This may be because violence and heavy drinking both reflect a 
common source of poor impulse control-impaired CNS serotonin functioning. 247 
People with strong aggressive and antisocial tendencies are especially prone to 
237. Kenneth G. Lloyd et aI., Serotonin and 5-Hydroxy-lndoleacetic Acid in Discrete Areas of the Brainstem 
of Suicide Victims and Control Patients, II ADVANCES BIOCHEMICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 387 (1974); Marie 
Asberg et aI., 5-HIAA in the Cerebrospinal Fluid: A Biochemical Suicide Predictor?, 33 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 1193 (1976). 5-hydroxyindoleacetic (5-HIAA) acid is a metabolite, or breakdown product, of the 
neurotransmitter serotonin. DORLAND'S, supra note 236, at 844. Serotonin activity in the central nervous system 
can therefore be assessed by measuring levels of 5-HIAA in the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), "the fluid contained with 
the four ventricles of the brain, the subarachnoid space, and the central canal of the spinal cord." Id. at 1018. CSF 
is obtained using a medical procedure called a "lumbar puncture," or more colloquially, a "spinal tap," in which a 
needle is inserted between the lower lumbar vertebrae and a small amount of fluid is withdrawn for analysis. Id. at 
1495. 
238. For recent discussions on the links between serotonin levels and these behaviors, see J.D. Higley, 
Individual Differences in Alcohol-Induced Aggression: A Nonhuman-Primate Model, 25 ALCOHOL REs. & HEALTH 
12 (2001); and F. Gerard Moeller et aI., Psychiatric Aspects of Impulsivity, 158 AM. 1. PSYCHIATRY 1783 (2001). 
239. See J.R. Hseu et aI., Effect of Exogenous Tryptophan on Cannabalism, Survival and Growth in Juvenile 
Grouper, Epinephelus coioides, 218 AQUACULTURE 251, 251 (2003) ("[ClannabiIism among juvenile groupers 
could be mitigated by the oral administration of' tryptophan, a biochemical precursor of serotonin.). 
240. T.S. Sperry et aI., Effects of Acute Treatment with 8-0H-DPATand Flouxetine on Aggressive Behaviour 
in Male Song Sparrows (Melospiza melodia morphna), 15 J. NEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 150 (2003) (noting that a 
bird's behavior can be altered by administration of drugs that affect serotonin levels). 
24 I. Craig F. Ferris et aI., Vasopressin/Serotonin Interactions in the Anterior Hypothalamus Control 
Aggressive Behavior in Golden Hamsters, 17 J. NEUROSCIENCE 4331 (1997). 
242. Dana R. Reisner et aI., Comparison of Cerebrospinal Fluid Monoamine Metabolite Levels in Dominant-
aggressive and Non-aggressive Dogs, 714 BRAIN RES. 57 (1996). 
243. J.D. Higley et aI., A Nonhuman Primate Model of Type 1/ Alcoholism? Part 2. Diminished Social 
Competence and Excessive Aggression Correlates with Low Cerebrospinal Fluid 5-Hydroxyindoleacetic Acid 
Concentrations, 20 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RES. 643 (1996). 
244. F. Gerard Moeller et aI., Tryptophan Depletion and Aggressive Responding in Healthy Males, 126 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 97 (1996). 
245. Robert O. Pihl & Jordan B. Peterson, Alcohol, Serotonin and Aggression, 17 ALCOHOL HEALTH RES. 
WORLD 113 (1993); Linnoila & Charney, supra note 202, at 860-64 (summarizing studies in humans and animals). 
246. Matti Virkkunen et aI., CSF Biochemistries, Glucose Metabolism, and Dillrnal Activity Rhythms in 
Alcoholic, Violent Offenders, Fire Setters, and Healthy Volunteers, 51 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 20 (1994); 
Jaakko Lappalainen et aI., Linkage of Antisocial Alcoholism to the Serotonin 5-HTI B Receptor Gene in 2 
Populations, 55 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATR Y 989 (1998) (showing linkage between antisocial alcoholism and genes 
for serotonin autoreceptors in two distinct ethnic populations: Finnish and a Southwestern American Indian Tribe). 
247. Higley et aI., supra note 243, at 17. 
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becoming aggressive when they drink. 248 Biology confmns what criminologists have 
long known: many acts of criminal violence occur when perpetrators are 
intoxicated,249 and a large number of criminals who end up on death row were 
intoxicated at the time of their offenses.25o 
Low serotonin activity is not itself a psychiatric diagnosis. Persons diagnosed 
with a broad variety of conditions-including depression, alcohol dependence, and 
antisocial personality disorder-may have low serotonin activity. What unites these 
persons is the biological status of their nervous system, which can be objectively and 
scientifically assessed by measuring a metabolite of serotonin in spinal fluid. 251 
Strong biological evidence links low serotonin to impulsiveness and to being less 
responsive to social cues that inhibit appetites and aggression. This means that 
people with low serotonin activity are at a physiological disadvantage when it comes 
to obeying the law's dictates. If mental retardation renders a murderer not culpable 
enough to suffer the death penalty, then why shouldn't low serotonin? 
VI.C.S. Other Psychiatric Disorders 
Brain damage, schizophrenia, ADHD, and low brain serotonin are just a few of 
the psychiatric conditions that are associated with impairment of-as the key 
wording in Atkins put it-"capacities to understand and process information, to 
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in 
logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.,,252 
A slew of other psychiatric disorders, some of which are common among homicide 
defendants, produce many of the same limitations. Examples include manic-
depression,253 pervasive developmental disorders,254 intermittent explosive 
248. See generally F. Gerard Moeller & Donald M. Dougherty, Antisocial Personality Disorder, Alcohol, and 
Aggression, 25 ALcOHOL REs. HEALTH 5, 8-9 (2001) (citing and summarizing studies that show a correlation 
between people with aggressive and antisocial tendencies and their tendency to be more prone to aggression when 
they drink). 
249. See, e.g., Susan E. Martin et aI., Self-Reported Alcohol Use and Abuse by Arrestees in the 1998 Arrestee 
Drug Abuse Monitoring Program, 25 ALCOHOL RES. HEALTH 72, 78 (2001). 
250. See generally Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 206, at 193. 
251. For an explanation, see Higley et aI., supra note 243. 
252. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
253. Manic-depressive illness is the older but still-used term for what DSM-N-TR calls "bipolar disorders." 
DSM-N -TR, supra note 84, at 382-40 I. Bipolar disorders are characterized by episodes of mania, which are 
distinct period(s] during which there is an abnormally and persistently elevated, expansive, or 
irritable mood ... accompanied by ... additional symptoms ... includ[ing] inflated self-esteem or 
grandiosity, decreased need for sleep, pressure of speech, flight of ideas, distractibility, increased 
involvement in goal-directed activities or psychomotor agitation, and excessive involvement in 
pleasurable activities with a high potential for painful consequences. 
1d. at 357. This disorder correlates with occurrences of "[c]hild abuse, spouse abuse, or other violent 
behavior ... during severe Manic Episodes or during those with psychotic features." 1d. at 384. There is also strong 
evidence that Bipolar I Disorder is genetic. [d. at 386 ("Twin and adoption studies provide strong evidence of a 
genetic influence for Bipolar I Disorder. "). 
254. See DSM-N-TR, supra note 84, at 69-84. DSM-N-TR states, "Pervasive Development Disorders are 
characterized by severe and pervasive impairment in several areas of development: reciprocal social interaction 
skills, communication skills, or the presence of stereotyped behavior, interests, and activities." [d. at 69. The 
disorders sometimes occur in the context of "chromosomal abnormalities, congenital infections, [or] structural 
abnormalities of the central nervous system." [d. at 69-70. In an Ohio case, the presence of a pervasive 
developmental disorder was the basis for a trial court judge's decision to set aside a jury's recommendation of the 
death penalty. State v. Fuller, 2002 Ohio 4110 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2002) (unpublished table decision) 
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disorder,255 antisocial personality disorder,256 and posttraumatic stress disorder.257 By 
making execution of persons with one psychiatric diagnosis "cruel and unusual 
punishment," Atkins has opened a psychiatric can of wonns. In coming years, 
attorneys representing capital defendants will increasingly ask mental health experts 
to present courts with the burgeoning evidence of the biological bases for numerous 
other mental disorders. Confronted with such evidence, courts will have no choice 
but to examine several psychiatric conditions that may be at least as disabling as 
mental retardation. Courts must now decide whether these conditions, either by 
virtue of those conditions' "definition" or the conditions' brain-based relationship258 
(affinning conviction and life sentence and mentioning author as expert witness); Janice Morse, Court Affirms 2 
Butler Cases; Orders I Resentence, CINCIN. ENQ., Aug. 13,2002, at 3B (stating, defendant's "mental conditions 
[werel among the factors that influenced [judge'sl decision to spare Mr. Fuller's life"). 
Id. 
255. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 84, at 663-64. Persons with intermittent explosive disorder experience 
discrete episodes of failure to resist aggressive impulses that result in serious assaultive acts or 
destruction of property .... The degree of aggressiveness expressed during an episode is grossly 
out of proportion to any provocation or precipitating psychosocial stressor .... The disorder may 
result in ... hospitalizations (e.g., because of injuries incurred in fights or accidents), ... 
incarcerations, or other legal problems. 
256. Persons with antisocial personality disorder display "a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation 
of, the rights of others ... and may repeatedly get into fights or commit acts of physical assault." Id. at 701-02. The 
disorder "is more common among the first-degree biological relatives or those with the disorder than among the 
general population." [d. at 704. 
257. Persons with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) develop "characteristic symptoms following exposure 
to an extreme traumatic stressor" to which they respond with "intense fear, helplessness, or horror." Id. at 463. The 
symptoms include "persistent reexperiencing of the traumatic event, ... persistent avoidance of stimuli associated 
with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness, ... and persistent symptoms of increased arousaL" Id. In 
extreme cases of PTSD, sufferers may experience auditory hallucinations and paranoid thinking. They may also 
have the following symptoms: "self-destructive and impulsive behavior; ... hostility; ... feeling constantly 
threatened ...... [d. at 465. "[Sleverallines of data have converged to reveal specific neurobiological alterations in" 
PTSD. These include "short-tenn memory deficits" reflecting limbic dysfunction, limbic abnonnalities displayed 
in MRI studies, "reduce[dl hippocampal volumes," and functional brain imaging studies showing "excessive 
amydala activation ... in response to trauma-related stimuli." Jeffrey David Lewine et aI., Abnormal Stimulus-
Response Intensity Functions in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: An Electrophysiologicallnvestigation, 159 AM. 
1. PSYCHIATRY 1689, 1689 (2002) (finding that brain activity differed from nonnal response in fifty-eight percent 
of subjects with PTSD). ''The development of PTSD symptoms after traumatic injury is associated with a more 
fragmented pattern of ... REM sleep, the sleep stage most specifically associated with dreaming." Thomas A. 
Mellman et aI., REM Sleep and the Early Development of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1696, 1696 (2002) (discussing the importance of sleep in consolidating and processing of memory and distressing 
emotions). For a discussion of persons' genetic vulnerability to developing PTSD, see Murray B. Stein et aI., 
Genetic and Environmental Influences on Trauma Exposure and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms: A Twin 
Study, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1675, 1675-76 (2002) (citing and summarizing findings from studies on genetic 
vulnerability to develop PTSD). 
258. Recognizing that the subject is controversial and deserves far more discussion, I offer just a short 
comment on this section's emphasis on the "brain-based" aspects of psychiatric conditions. Why are brain 
abnonnalities, and explanations based on them, potentially exculpatory? The reason is that, unlike actions or one's 
"character," abnonnal patterns of brain functioning are physical states. We hold rational agents responsible for their 
actions because we regard actions as a prima facie reflection of a person's willingness to follow rules, and because 
we believe that most adults have "the general capacity to grasp and be guided by good reason in particular legal 
contexts." Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189, 192 (1999) [hereinafter Morse, 
Crazy Reasons I. Since Aristotle, philosophers have "thought that because human beings have the capacity to shape 
their character they can fairly be held responsible for being the kind of persons they are." MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAw 
AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 110 (1984). Both actions and character are explained by 
individuals' mental states (their beliefs, desires, or dispositions), rather than as physical properties. 
By contrast, we do not hold people responsible for certain physical attributes that they cannot help 
having (e.g., being short, bald, or ugly) because these attributes are not actions or things that stem from actions and 
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to impaired mental functioning, should confer upon their sufferers the protections 
equal to those that Atkins has given to persons with mental retardation. 
VI.D. The Diagnosis-Implies-Excuse Mistake 
Atkins obligates courts both to decide whether several mental conditions should 
mitigate death sentences and to perpetuate the mistaken claim that it is a mentally 
disabled person's diagnosis that provides the reason for our (often correct) impulse 
to hold him less than fully responsible. In expressing his reluctant agreement with 
Justice Scalia's position in Atkins, Professor Bersoff notes, 
IQ, after all, is not the factor that render the imposition of the death penalty 
against those with mental retardation unjust. Rather, IQ is a proxy, and an 
imperfect one at that, for a combination of factors, such as maturity, judgment, 
and the capability of assessing the consequences of one's conduct, that 
determine the relative culpability of a mentally retarded killer .... Culpability, not, 
IQ, should be the benchmark.,,259 
In a series of superb articles,260 Professor Stephen Morse has articulated what roles 
he believes mental health professionals and psychiatric diagnosis should and should 
not play in deciding whether agents possess "sufficient capacity for rationality to be 
responsible.,,261 Professor Morse argues that when the law requires a decision 
whether a defendant lacks sufficient rationality to be fully responsible, what the 
factfinder most needs is "a detailed, descriptive account of the agent's reasons for 
action in the context in question. These data may be obtained from family, friends, 
co-workers, observers, and mental health professionals.,,262 Although all these 
observers may have information relevant to the factfinder's decision, what mental 
health professionals add, beyond being "trained, efficient observers,,,263 is their 
scientific knowledge about the characteristics of people similar to the individual in 
question.264 Yet the decision whether someone' s capacity for rationality is sufficient 
to hold him responsible ultimately is "a common sense inference," so that "the final 
judgment must be about the specific individual who is the potential subject of 
special mental health law treatment.,,265 
could not possibly reflect or be explained by a person's mental states. We do not hold people responsible for being 
mentally retarded because we regard this attribute, like physical attributes, as neither a mental state nor a property 
that reflects morally defective mental states (e.g., "not trying hard enough"). Similarly, defects in brain structure 
and abnonnal patterns of neuronal functioning strike me as potentially guilt-mitigating insofar as we regard them 
as not reflecting or stemming from a defendant's blamew(;rthy actions. 
259. Bersoff, supra note 157, at 568. 
260. See Morse, Crazy Reasons, supra note 258; Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals. and Science: 
An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978) [hereinafter Morse, Crazy Behavior); Stephen 
1. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REV. 971 
(1982) [hereinafter Morse, Failed Explanations]; Stephen 1. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 
88 VA. L. REV. 1025 (2002). 
261. Morse, Crazy Reasons, supra note 258, at 218. 
262. Id. at 217. 
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264. Id. at 219. 
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Although Professor Morse has long believed that psychiatric diagnoses should 
play little or no role in legal proceedings,266 diagnosis is the vehicle mental health 
professionals use to decide what sort of problem a person has and what types of 
characteristics are displayed by other individuals who are similar to the person in 
question. Professor Morse questions "whether a diagnosis produces value added 
beyond the infonnation conveyed by the behavioral criteria that define the 
diagnostic category.,,267 A reasonable response is that-to the extent that diagnostic 
schemes are valid and that an individual's diagnosis has been properly rendered-a 
diagnosis invokes the consensus of mental health professionals,268 not just the 
opinion of the expert who happens to be testifying. Testifying experts can rely on, 
and convey to factfinders, what psychiatry knows about individuals with the diag-
nosis. Experts can use diagnoses to show that a particular defendant indeed shares 
psychological features (symptoms and behaviors) with others who receive the 
diagnosis, and that the defendant's future clinical characteristics can be expected to 
follow a particular pattern.269 Identifying a set of symptoms and behaviors with a 
diagnosis (especially when scientific evidence links biology to patterns of thought 
and behavior) may serve the additional, important purpose of helping jurors and 
judges consider other explanations for a defendant's behavior besides such common-
but-psychologically-naive explanations as being the result of sheer evil, careless-
ness, faking, or not trying hard enough. 
But if Professor Morse undervalues the contribution of psychiatric diagnoses to 
legal proceedings, the Atkins decision proves he is correct about the potential 
problems that relying on diagnoses can cause in mental health adjudications: 
[D]iagnoses ... tend to encourage the mistaken impression that the conduct of 
crazy people is just a mechanism, rather than action for reasons. Diagnoses tend 
to encourage question-begging about the foundational, nonresponsibility 
criterion that authorizes special mental health treatment. Diagnoses are therefore 
prejudicial and misleading. In addition, there is often dispute about the 
appropriate diagnosis, if any, which wastes time and distracts the factfinder from 
the essential question .... 270 
266. [d. See also Morse, Crazy Belwvior, supra note 260, at 604-15; Morse, Failed Explanations, supra note 
260, at 1059-70. 
267. Morse, Crazy Reasons, supra note 258, at 219. 
268. "OSM-IV was a team effort. More than \000 people (and numerous professional organizations) have 
helped us in the preparation of this document." OSM-IV-TR, supra note 84, at xix. See also id. at xxiii-xxiv 
(describing the process by which the manual was created). 
269. Notwithstanding the cautions discussed in section V, supra, the diagnostic manual notes the potentially 
valid uses of diagnoses in adjudicatory proceedings: 
[Wjhen the presence of a mental disorder is the predicate for a subsequent legal determination 
(e.g., involuntary civil commitment), the use of an established system of diagnosis enhances the 
value and reliability of the determination. By providing a compendium based on a review of the 
pertinent clinical and research literature, OSM-IV may facilitate the legal decision makers' 
understanding of the relevant characteristics of mental disorders. The literature related to 
diagnoses also serves as a check on ungrounded speculation about mental disorders and about 
the functioning of a particular individual. Fina\1y, diagnostic information regarding longitudinal 
course may improve decision making when the legal issue concerns an individual's mental 
functioning at a past or future point in time. 
OSM-IV-TR, supra note 84, at xxxiii. 
270. Morse, Crazy Reasons, supra note 258, at 220. 
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The essential question is what a particular defendant deserves. This moral 
determination may be informed by knowledge of the defendant's psychiatric 
diagnosis, but is logically independent of that diagnosis. Psychiatric diagnoses may 
summarize patterns of conduct, but the moral qualities of a particular act-and the 
appropriate legal response to that particular act-are not within the province of 
psychiatrists' special knowledge. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Increased knowledge about the biological underpinnings of mental illness may 
well help convince courts that sufferers of several mental disorders deserve the same 
constitutional protections that Atkins confers upon defendants with mental 
retardation. Given the high rate of serious mental illness among homicide 
defendants, granting psychiatric exemptions could leave very few individuals 
eligible for the death penalty. 
To death penalty opponents, such a development might seem desirable. U.S. law 
now regards execution as a special punishment that only the most blameworthy 
killers deserve. Yet, a high proportion of the murderers who become death row 
inmates have serious mental impairments. By focusing their arguments against 
executing persons who are psychiatrically impaired, capital punishment's opponents 
have an opportunity to use psychiatry to virtually abolish the death penalty. The 
moral basis for doing this is nicely summarized by psychologists Mark D. 
Cunningham and Mark P. Vigen, who, after reviewing studies describing the mental 
problems of death row inmates, write, 
it is disturbing that so many inmates on death row are so obviously 
damaged-developmentally, intellectually, educationally, neurologically, and 
psychologically. To the extent that the death penalty is intended to punish those 
murderers who are most morally culpable, there would seem to be some 
miscarriage of that intent when it is visited upon individuals who are manifestly 
damaged, deficient, or disturbed in lheir psychological development and 
functioning.271 
By creating an exemption for one group of persons who are "manifestly ... 
deficient," Atkins seems like the beginning of a solution to the moral problem that 
Cunningham and Vigen describe. But death penalty opponents and advocates for the 
mental disabled should realize that Atkins carries the potential for creating other 
difficulties. The decision demeans persons with mental retardation by saying that 
solely by virtue of this condition, they lack the moral capacity to be fully culpable. 
It creates a national legal precedent for using psychiatric categories to single out a 
group of citizens for different legal treatment. It fails to recognize that psychiatric 
diagnoses are created for clinical purposes (chiefly, to guide treatment) and are often 
redefined as treatments, and scientific findings reveal the errors of older 
categorizations. Finally, Atkins tells mental health professionals that despite any 
"cautionary statements," courts will use their classification schemes to solve legal 
271. Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 206, at 207. 
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and social problems that lie far beyond the purpose and intent of psychiatric 
diagnosis. 
For several years, the U.S. Supreme Court has responded to grave flaws in the 
nation's administration of the death penalty with a series of procedural and 
substantive requirements that give mental health professionals big parts in the 
capital punishment process. With Atkins, the courtroom roles of psychiatrists and 
psychologists will now enlarge. In treatment settings, the mental health clinician 
often attempts to remove impediments to self-understanding and thereby enable 
people to function better. But mental health experts do not come to court with the 
purpose of promoting self-understanding, and neither their diagnostic classifications 
nor their therapeutic skills will "cure" the fundamental social and economic 
disparities that make even capital punishment's supporters uncomfortable.272 
Given what psychiatrists and psychologists now know about the sources and 
behavioral consequences of mental disorders, it only makes sense for courts to 
request their insights. As Professor Gary B. Melton and his colleagues point out, 
"mental health professionals do have access to a body of specialized knowledge 
(Le., knowledge commonly unshared by the lay public) that may assist legal 
factfinders in making informed judgments. ,,273 It is hard to think of a situation in 
which courts have greater need for mental health professionals' oQservations, 
formulations, and opinions than when a jury decides whether a mentally impaired 
defendant deserves execution. But giving psychiatric diagnosis a determinative role 
in capital sentencing distorts the legitimate role of mental health experts in assisting 
the factfinder.274 In the long run, Atkins may compound problems in the 
administration of the death penalty if it convinces courts, juries, and legislatures that 
an accurate medical diagnosis will assure the fairness of -or, worse yet, is an 
272. See, e.g., George H. Ryan, Executive Order Creating the Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment 
(May 4, 2000), available at hup:llwww.idoc.il.us/ccp/ccp/executive_order.html(last visited Sept. 19, 2002) 
(expressing support for the death penalty in principle, but establishing a commission to study and recommend 
safeguards in capital punishment because "the number of death sentences and criminal convictions being vacated 
or overturned has raised serious concerns with respect to the process by which the death penalty is imposed"). On 
January 31, 2000, "prompted by serious questions about the operation of capital punishment in Illinois," Governor 
Ryan issued a moratorium on administering the death penalty. REPORT OF THE GoVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT I (Apr. 15,2002). The Commission offered eighty-five recommendations concerning the 
death penalty's administration in Illinois. On January 1 I, 2003, just before leaving office, Governor Ryan issued 
a blanket commutation for all 167 death row inmates in the state. Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issue of Fairness, Governor 
Clears Out Death Row in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at 1. See also Dennis O'Brien & David Nitkin, 
Glendening Halts Executions; Md. Governor Is Second to Impose Moratorium; Racial, Geographic Inequality Seen; 
UM Study to Be Reviewed by Next General Assembly, BALT. SUN, May 10,2002, at lA (stating that Maryland 
Governor, who also supports the death penalty in principle, halted executions in that state pending results of a 
University of Maryland study of racial disparities in death penalty sentencing). 
273. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL 
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 19 (2d ed. 1997). 
274. FED. R. EVID. 702 states, 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if 
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of 
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case. 
(emphasis added). 
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acceptable substitute for-a moral judgment about the defendant. 275 However Atkins 
affects determinations about who will be executed, it perpetuates the fantasy that 
"getting psychiatric help" makes death sentences fairer and more palatable. 
275. As Professor Morse noted several years ago, "overreliance on experts promotes the mistaken and 
responsibility-abdicating view that these hard moral questions (i.e., whether and in what way to treat mentally ill 
persons differently) are scientific ones .... " Stephen J. Morse, Law and Mental Health Professionals: The Limits 
of Expertise, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 389 (1978). 
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